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## Letter from the Secretary General

Honorable participants,

My name is Arda and I, as the Secretary-General of the Gazi College Model United Nations 2022, am very honored to welcome you all to the fourth annual session of GCMUN on behalf of our Director-General Deniz Başak and also our well-prepared academic and organization team members.

While organizing GCMUN our aim was to provide all of our participants significant and remarkable experiences; and consequently, rising awareness through global issues that our world is facing has been our main purpose. In this conference, we ensure you that you will gain diversified world visions about the current situation from our agenda items and it will redound your debating and negotiating skills, therewithal your knowledge and sensibility.

As the academic team of GCMUN'22 we have chosen our committees in order to make you focus on various topics and they are suitable for various levels of MUNers, so you will be able to enjoy. We have 6 different committees for both highly experienced and unexperienced delegates. Our first GA committee is GA-1:DISEC and our second one is UNEP. Moreover we have United Nations Security Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, JCC: British Civil Conflicts and lastly a JR United Nations International Children's Emergency and Fund committee which we only opened for middle school students in order for them to state their opinions confidently about the current issue of the world since every child are affected from every single conflict that composed in our world.

I highly encourage all of you to be well-prepared and enthusiastic in order to be efficient during the conference.

Best regards,

## Letter from the Under-Secretary-General

## Esteemed participants,

My name is Alkım Özkazanç, and I am an undergraduate student of Political Science and Public Administration at Middle East Technical University. Having started my MUN career four years ago, I have participated in various conferences and held various positions in those conferences. Now, I am getting prepared for GCMUN 2022, which will be the first conference that I will attend as an Under Secretary-General.

The issue of security has always been a central concern for politics and international relations, so much so that the term "high politics" mainly refers to security affairs. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a direct product of this priority given to security affairs. It is one of the most important military alliances ever founded in the modern era and has been playing a principal role in global politics since its inception in 1949. What distinguishes it from many other military alliances is that NATO continuously seeks to integrate the military resources, assets, and capabilities of its member states into a centralized structure in order to reach a substantive principle: interoperability.

As the delegates participating in the NATO committee, you are expected to articulate new proposals aimed at improving the general interoperability within NATO, thereby ensuring that the alliance continues to serve its main purpose: collective defence. The need to articulate such proposals has gained more importance and has become more urgent as Russia's growing assertiveness and its invasion of Ukraine pose the greatest risk for Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. You will deliberate on two agenda items, both of which relate to the principle of interoperability and collective defence. During the last few months, NATO has been adjusting its policies related to the agenda items in order to better respond to the security environment shaped by the Russian invasion of Ukraine; thus, the delegates should think of ways that will help counter the growing security threat in Eastern Europe while addressing the topics under both agenda items.

I really hope that participating in this year's NATO committee will help the delegates improve their knowledge of NATO's structure, working principles, and policies. Moreover, I expect the delegates to adopt a true, cooperation-oriented NATO mentality as the obligation to take every decision unanimously should lead the delegates to engage in constructive compromise while developing new policies in order to address the changing security environment.

I would like to end my letter by thanking the academic and organization team members of GCMUN 2022. I would especially like to thank my Secretary-General Mr. Arda Elibol for including me in the team & swiftly addressing my inquiries and my Deputy Secretary-General Miss Zehra Yıldırım for her helpful work.

With my sincere wishes,

Alkım Özkazanç,

Under-Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

## 1. The Basics of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO for short) is a political and military Alliance based in the North Atlantic Region. Its main purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through various political and military means while promoting democratic values and preventing conflicts. It currently has 30 member states (of which 27 are in Europe, 2 in North America, and 1 in Asia) that are bound together by the principle of collective defense, allowing them to consult and cooperate under the banner of NATO.<sup>1</sup>



Figure 1:NATO's official flag, which was approved in 1953<sup>2</sup>

# A. NATO's History and Development in Brief

Following the end of the Second World War in 1945, the Soviet Union gained notable influence over Eastern Europe, where they set up authoritarian communist regimes. Moreover, the Soviets wanted to extend their influence further over Europe and spread communism through the continent.<sup>3</sup> The nations of Western Europe, which gave importance to the preservation of liberal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "What is NATO?," *NATO*, accessed May 13, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html</u>. <sup>2</sup> Sarang, *Flag of NATO*, flag, Wikimedia Commons, July 29, 2020,

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag\_of\_NATO.svg.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> David G. Haglund, "North Atlantic Treaty Organization," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, last updated April 11, 2022, <u>https://www.britannica.com/topic/North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization</u>.

and democratic values, came to see the Soviets' endeavors as a security problem. Thus, a debate emerged about how this security problem could be addressed in a recently destabilized continent. <sup>4</sup> At the time, the United States was a close ally of these Western European nations and an adversary of the Soviet Union, which entailed them to join this debate as well.<sup>5</sup>

It was decided that forming a collective defence Alliance would be an adequate way to deter the Soviet Union and protect security. As a result, The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty) was signed by 12 states<sup>6</sup> on April 4, 1949.<sup>7</sup> The treaty emphasized the commitment of parties to maintain military cooperation, engage in collective defence when a party is subjected to an armed attack, and consult together in the presence of security threats. To achieve the latter, the treaty called for the establishment of a council<sup>8</sup>, thereby creating the foundations of the North Atlantic Council and NATO. Shortly after, NATO developed into an organization underlined by the integration of member states' militaries into a joint structure. The military integration and NATO's nuclear retaliation strategy proved successful measures for deterring the Soviet Union from performing an armed attack throughout the Cold War Period. However, NATO was not solely a military organization during this time. It acquired political characteristics during the 1960s and started to engage with the Warsaw Pact<sup>9</sup> (including the Soviet Union) countries in diplomatic settings. NATO admitted four new member states during the Cold War, bringing the total number of members to 16.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> "A Short History of NATO," NATO, accessed May 13, 2022,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\_139339.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Haglund, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> These 12 states were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> "The North Atlantic Treaty," opened for signature April 4, 1949, *E-Library of North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\_texts\_17120.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The Warsaw Pact (1955-1991) was a military alliance formed by the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Bloc countries to counter NATO.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> NATO, A Short History of NATO

When the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1991, NATO's future came under question: what other purposes could the organization serve when there was no significant adversary to deter? To address this question, NATO started to emphasize providing the foundation of collective security that would encourage democratization and political integration in Europe, promoting it as the new main purpose it serves.<sup>11</sup> Following this new approach, NATO started to engage in crisis-management operations aimed at maintaining security and political stability.<sup>12</sup> The operations extended beyond Europe to fight terrorism (and other sources of security threats for NATO) following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and they remained NATO's primary focus through the 2000s and 2010s. Another important development that took place after the end of the Cold War was the initiation of partnership programs with different states & actors all around the world in order to build security outside of NATO's borders.<sup>13</sup> From 1999 onwards, some partners in Eastern Europe (most of which were former Eastern Bloc countries) were admitted as NATO members; the most recent example was the admission of North Macedonia in 2020.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Haglund, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> NATO, A Short History of NATO

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Haglund, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Figure 2: A map showing NATO's enlargement in Europe over the years<sup>15</sup>

# B. Current NATO Structure: Organs and their functions

NATO is an extensive organization that formulates and executes policies in various areas and through various means. As a result, NATO consists of different organs interacting with each other within a detailed hierarchical scheme. Of those organs, only the relevant ones will be mentioned in this chapter.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body of NATO; the political consultation process takes place in the NAC. Being the only NATO organ founded by the Washington Treaty (Article 9) itself, it is superior to all other NATO committees and units.<sup>16</sup> The only body not subordinated to the NAC is the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG),

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Patrickneil, *Map of NATO historic enlargement in Europe*, map, Wikimedia Commons, last updated April 11, 2022, <u>https://tr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dosya:History\_of\_NATO\_enlargement.svg</u>
 <sup>16</sup> "North Atlantic Council," *NATO*, last updated October 10, 2017,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\_49763.htm

which acts as the senior body on nuclear matters.<sup>17</sup> The NAC's jurisdiction covers all aspects of NATO's activities, including political and military activities. Each NATO member state has a national delegation that represents the state in the NAC, led by permanent representatives (ambassadors). The NAC regularly gathers at three different levels (permanent representatives, foreign or defence ministers, heads of state and government) to make decisions that steer the main direction of NATO's actions; these decisions are based on the reports and advice originating from its subordinate committees. The NAC takes decisions unanimously, meaning each one of the 30 members must give consent in order for NATO to take a certain action.<sup>18</sup>

The **Secretary-General** is the civil servant responsible for steering the consultation and decision-making process in NATO. They are unanimously appointed by member states for a four-year term. They chair the meetings of senior decision-making bodies (including the NAC), guide the process of consensus-building within NATO, act as a spokesperson for NATO, and head the International Staff, which is a civilian NATO body responsible for providing guidance to the national delegations at NATO Headquarters.<sup>19 20</sup> Jens Stoltenberg is the Secretary-General since 2014.<sup>21</sup>

NATO has a detailed military structure subordinated to the NAC. The **Military Committee** is situated at the top of this structure. The committee, wherein military representatives (or chiefs of defence) of member states gather, has two main functions. The first function is to provide the NAC and the NPG with military-related advice as a means of guiding those senior bodies about their military decisions. The second function of the Military Committee is to translate the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> "Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)," *NATO*, last updated May 9, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\_50069.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> NATO, North Atlantic Council

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> NATO, What is NATO?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> "NATO Secretary General," *NATO*, last updated March 31, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\_50094.htm</u>

political decisions of senior bodies into military strategies. To achieve this, the Military Committee holds two strategic commands under its authority, collectively known as the **NATO Command Structure (NCS)**.<sup>22</sup>

The first one of those commands is the **Allied Command Operations (ACO)**. It is responsible for the planning and execution of all NATO military operations, as directed by the NAC. It is headed by the **Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)** and headquartered in Belgium.<sup>23</sup> ACO operates at three levels: strategic, tactical, and operational<sup>24</sup>; it oversees several commands operating at those levels.<sup>25</sup>

The second one of those commands is the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Its responsibilities include leading the military adaptation and the transformation of the Alliance, improving the various military capabilities of NATO, and coordinating the national efforts of member states by promoting interoperability. ACT is headed by **Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)** and is headquartered in the United States. Like ACO, ACT directs various subordinate joint commands with differing competencies.<sup>26</sup>

However, it should be known that NATO does not have permanent forces on its own despite having a military command structure. During operations, member states contribute military

<sup>22</sup> "Military Committee," *NATO*, Last updated August 25, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49633.htm.

<sup>23</sup> The ACO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, is named the **Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe** (SHAPE).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Even though it is not very easy to explain the distinction between these three concepts, an oversimplified explanation could be conceived as follows: the strategic level is concerned with the formulation of policies via long-term planning, the tactical level is concerned with the means and the procedures used to implement those policies via short(er)-term planning, and the operational level is concerned with directly executing those policies in unique settings.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> "Allied Command Operations (ACO)," *NATO*, Last updated October 23, 2020, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\_52091.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> "Allied Command Transformation," *NATO*, Last updated September 23, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\_52092.htm</u>.

forces on a voluntary basis to be placed under the authority of the SACEUR.<sup>27</sup> Together, these forces are included in the structure known as the **NATO Force Structure (NFS)**.<sup>28</sup>

Lastly, there are the **NATO Organizations and Agencies**, which are established to meet the collective requirements of some or all allies in the field of procurement, logistics, and other forms of services. They are not included in the military or the civilian structure of NATO and are thus autonomous even though they are required to operate under NAC-approved charters.<sup>29</sup>



# C. Strategic Concepts

Flexibility has always remained a central concept for NATO. The political environment, security threats, and other conditions relevant to NATO are constantly changing. Thus, NATO needs to adapt itself to those changes and formulate policies accordingly in order to continue fulfilling its mission successfully over extended periods of time. It does so by adopting new **strategic** 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> NATO, What is NATO?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> "The NATO Force Structure," *NATO*, Last updated February 13, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_69718.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> "Organisations and agencies," *NATO*, Last updated March 31, 2020, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_66470.htm</u>. <sup>30</sup> NATO. What is NATO?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> NATO, What is NATO?

**concepts**, which are the documents setting a guideline for the political and military stance of the Alliance by indicating its vision for the upcoming decade<sup>31</sup>, in regular intervals. Simply put, the strategic concepts codify the recent changes that have happened in a security context and describe the way in which the NATO (and its member states) is going to respond to those changes in the following years.<sup>32</sup>

The current NATO Strategic Concept in effect is the one adopted in the 2010 Lisbon Summit, titled "Active Engagement, Modern Defence", which underlined three essential core tasks of NATO: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. However, the trends that have emerged since then (especially the growing Russian assertiveness in Eastern Europe and the weakening faith of some member states in NATO) have led NATO to seek a departure from some of the points mentioned in the 2010 Strategic Concept.<sup>33</sup> In 2020, Jens Stoltenberg convened a group of experts to formulate recommendations about NATO's policies in the upcoming decade, leading to the creation of a brand-new agenda introduced under the **NATO 2030 Initiative**.<sup>34</sup> The agenda, which consists of various proposals aimed at conserving NATO's military strength and improving its political strength, was endorsed by NATO leaders during the 2021 Brussels Summit. Among those proposals was the development of a new strategic concept to replace the outdated 2010 Strategic Concept.<sup>33</sup> The **2022 Strategic Concept** will be ratified during the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Zeynep Başaran, "Turkish Perspectives on the New NATO Strategic Concept," *EDAM*, March 29, 2022, https://edam.org.tr/en/turkish-perspectives-on-the-new-nato-strategic-concept/?utm\_source=rss&utm\_medium=rss& utm\_campaign=turkish-perspectives-on-the-new-nato-strategic-concept.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Luis Simón and Félix Arteaga, "NATO gets an update: the Madrid Strategic Concept," *Real Instituto Elcano*, January 17, 2022,

https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/nato-gets-an-update-the-madrid-strategic-concept/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Başaran, Turkish Perspectives on the New NATO Strategic Concept

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Simón and Arteaga, *NATO gets an update* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> "NATO 2030," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, June 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/nato\_static\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-nato2030-en.pdf</u>.

incoming NATO Summit<sup>36</sup> in Madrid on 27-28 June 2022 and is expected to parallel the proposals submitted under the NATO 2030 Agenda.<sup>37</sup>

## 2. Agenda Item I: Enhancing the Deterrence & Defence Capabilities of NATO

Collective defence is a very crucial principle that lies at the heart of NATO and characterizes it. This is reflected in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one of NATO members shall be considered an attack against all NATO members.<sup>38</sup> As a result, NATO emphasizes establishing an integrated defence mechanism aimed at guarding the security of its member states. Likewise, NATO also emphasizes deterring adversaries from taking any action that might threaten the security of its members. To achieve these goals, NATO has developed a variety of capabilities in different fields and seeks to utilize those capabilities as efficiently and as effectively as possible. However, it should be noted that NATO continuously aims at enhancing those capabilities through different means of adaptation to be able to address the changing security environment.<sup>39</sup> As a result, it has introduced various plans, concepts, and structures for guiding these adaptation processes, most of which are being designed and implemented by ACT. This agenda shall cover NATO's deterrence & defence capabilities and the measures aimed at enhancing them in two main fields: military and non-military.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> A NATO Summit is a North Atlantic Council Meeting at the level of heads of state/government

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Simón and Arteaga, NATO gets an update

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> "Deterrence and defence," *NATO*, Last updated March 28, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_133127.htm</u>.

#### A. Capabilities in the Military Field

#### 1. Military Concepts

As mentioned before, NATO needs to design systematic frameworks to be able to successfully direct its institutions towards reaching the desired goals. In the military area, there are two main concepts regulating NATO's enhancement of deterrence & defence capabilities: the **Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA)**, and the **NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC)**. DDA provides a coherent framework for employing force in order to deter & defence against NATO's main threats and to strengthen NATO's preparedness in the present day.<sup>40</sup> However, DDA is a confidential concept<sup>41</sup>, making it very hard to be elaborated on. On the other hand, the NWCC has been developed to guide the Alliance in sustaining military advantage and warfare development for the next twenty years by setting certain principles. The concept is often called the "Military North Star of the Alliance towards 2040", emphasizing its inclusiveness and substantiveness.<sup>42</sup>

The NWCC utilizes new principles of thinking. First, it acknowledges the longevity and the high adaptation capacity of NATO's adversaries. Second, it views warfare as a concept that should not be merely considered in geographical terms and aspires to adopt a multi-domain (unlike the traditional domains: land, maritime, air) and multi-regional approach. Third, it emphasizes the need to develop non-binary, non-linear, and simultaneous paradigms in an environment where the traditional distinction between war and peace has been blurred. Fourth, it recognizes the need

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Julian Lindley-French, "The TAG NATO Shadow Strategic Concept 2022: Preserving Peace, Protecting People," *GMF*, February 3, 2022,

https://www.gmfus.org/news/tag-nato-shadow-strategic-concept-2022-preserving-peace-protecting-people. <sup>41</sup> Jordan Williams, "NATO set to agree on new strategy to counter Russian threat," *The Hill*, October 21, 2021, <u>https://thehill.com/policy/international/russia/577731-nato-set-to-agree-on-new-strategy-to-counter-russian-threat/</u>. <sup>42</sup> John W. Tammen, "NATO's Warfighting Capstone Concept: anticipating the changing character of war," *NATO* 

*Review*, July 9, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/07/09/natos-warfighting-capstone-concept-anticipating-the-changing

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/07/09/natos-warfighting-capstone-concept-anticipating-the-changing -character-of-war/index.html.

to reform the military structure in the light of thinking principles mentioned above as the traditional notion of "command and control"<sup>43</sup> cannot accommodate those new principles by itself.<sup>44</sup>



# Figure 4: The logo of NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept<sup>45</sup>

To develop a military instrument of power compatible with the principles mentioned above, the NWCC sets five Warfare Development Imperatives, which are considered the "musts" that the Alliance needs to pursue<sup>46</sup>:

- Cognitive superiority: Understanding NATO's operating environment and adversaries adequately
- *Layered resilience:* Being able to withstand immediate shocks to supply lines & communications and persevering for long periods of time
- *Influence and power projection:* Shaping NATO's operating environment in a way that will benefit the allies and impose dilemmas on the adversaries
- *Integrated multi-domain defence:* Adopting flexible approaches in different domains to protect the Alliance from different sources of threats

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> NATO defines "command and control" as the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated individual over assigned resources in the accomplishment of a common goal.
 <sup>44</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> NATO, *NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept*, logo, NATO Allied Command Transformation, accessed May 29, 2022, <u>https://www.scribbr.com/chicago-style/image-citations/</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Ibid

• *Cross-domain command:* Allied commanders being able to apprehend instant developments in the operating environment and them taking the right actions in a more complex multi-domain environment

Although no strict classification is possible, the measures about military capabilities mentioned throughout the following chapters can be considered in relation to the imperatives of the NWCC.

## 2. Defence Planning and Multinational Capabilities

As NATO is an Alliance comprising 30 member states, its overall defence capability is determined in relation to the individual defence capabilities of member states. As a result, NATO views it as an important step for developing individual defence capabilities in an organized manner. To achieve that, NATO uses a process called the **Defence Planning Process (NDPP)**, which is aimed at assisting the allies with delivering required capabilities (in 14 different domains) within their national defence plans in the short and medium-term (up to 20 years). The process is also intended to be flexible in order to respond to the circumstances of both individual allies and the Alliance itself. <sup>47</sup>

The process starts with the establishment of political guidance. Political guidance originates from higher strategic policy documents (like Strategic Concepts), and it defines the characteristics of the operations that NATO intends to conduct in the future along with qualitative capability requirements those operations will necessitate. Political guidance is usually reviewed every four years by the **Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC)**. After this, the two strategic commands (ACO and ACT) set minimum capability requirements for the allies. In the case of individual allies, the commands develop **Capability Target packages** for each member state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> "NATO Defence Planning Process," *NATO*, Last updated March 31, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49202.htm</u>.

These packages apportion targets for the member states and include certain priorities and timelines for them to follow, even though they are flexible enough to allow innovative solutions. The target packages are then multilaterally examined by the allies and voted upon. Agreed packages are incorporated into the relevant member state's national defence planning process. The NDPP also includes the scrutinization of the member states' compliance with the packages and their military capabilities overall. These scrutinies and assessments are used to produce feedback for regulating the Alliance-wide capability policies.<sup>48</sup>



The Alliance also helps its members achieve multinational capability cooperation via **High Visibility Projects (HVPs)**, especially in areas where it is difficult for the member states to singlehandedly afford certain military capabilities. These projects are usually operated through establishing shared and/or integrated defence systems, and they are made between NATO members that agree to enhance their capability cooperation in a certain area via signing legal documents that specify the details of cooperation. There are currently 18 HVPs in areas such as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Ibid

air-to-air fueling, ammunition, maritime unmanned systems, command and control, and training. 50

## 3. Bolstering Readiness, Responsiveness and Reinforcement

NATO has always put an emphasis on readiness, responsiveness, and reinforcement since being able to respond to any crisis or direct military aggression in very short periods of time holds a crucial place in defence and warfare. Moreover, the ability to respond swiftly is also a factor that deters adversaries from engaging in conflicts in the first place.

During the early 2000s, the NATO leadership decided to make adjustments to the military structure. This was due to the reason that using large & massed units simply became unfeasible with the changing security environment, and there was a need to utilize agile and capable forces at graduated readiness levels.<sup>51</sup> This led to the creation of **NATO Force Structure (NFS)** in 2001<sup>52</sup>, and the **NATO Response Force (NRF)** in 2003.

NATO divides the HQs and the forces in the NFS into two categories: **High Readiness Forces** (HRF), which have a readiness range of 0 to 90 days, and Forces of Lower Readiness (FLR), which have a readiness range of 91 to 180 days.<sup>53</sup> High Readiness Forces (which are normally under the command of HQs in allied countries) participate in the NRF following a rotational basis where a certain force participates in the NRF for 12 months after being subjected to intense training in the months prior to it.<sup>54</sup> The forces participating in the NRF have a readiness range of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> "Multinational Capability Cooperation," *NATO*, Last updated May 19, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_163289.htm#:~:text=NATO%20is%20helping%20Allies%20and,comman d%20and%20control%2C%20and%20training</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> "NATO Response Force," *NATO*, Last updated May 10, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49755.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> "The NATO Force Structure," *NATO*, Last updated February 15, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohg/topics\_69718.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> NATO, *NATO Response Force* 

0 to 30 days. <sup>55</sup> A force participating in the NRF includes land, air, maritime, and **Special Operation Forces (SOF)** units.<sup>56</sup> The NRF is used exclusively for providing rapid military response to an emerging crisis, and it can be only deployed after a decision given by the North Atlantic Council.<sup>57</sup>

In order to further enhance the readiness and the responsiveness of the Alliance, NATO leaders launched the **Readiness Action Plan (RAP)** during the 2014 Wales Summit. The plan mainly consists of two groups of measures: assurance measures and adaptation measures. The assurance measures mostly focus on increasing the military activity in NATO territories close to the adversaries (such as Eastern Europe) and increasing the number of exercises organized by NATO as exercising also contributes to interoperability<sup>58,59</sup> Meanwhile, adaptation measures include longer-term changes to the NATO's forces and the command structure itself. With the adaptation measures, the NRF was strengthened as its personnel was increased from 13 thousand to 40 thousand. Moreover, a spearhead force at the core of the NRF, named the **Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)** was created. It includes 20 thousand troops in total and 5 thousand land troops able to deploy within two to three days. Several commands controlling the VJTF units were also created.<sup>60</sup>

Lastly, the allies agreed upon a **NATO Readiness Initiative** in 2018. Under the initiative, the allies committed to providing 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 battleships ready to use within 30 days.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> NATO, The NATO Force Structure

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> NATO, *NATO Response Force* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> NATO, The NATO Force Structure

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Interoperability is the ability to operate using harmonized standards, doctrines, procedures, and equipment <sup>59</sup> "Readiness Action Plan," *NATO*, Last updated July 15, 2021,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_119353.htm.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> NATO, *Deterrence and Defence* 



Figure 6: British soldiers train with French and Danish troops in Northumberland to prepare for roles in NATO's VJTF in 2017<sup>62</sup>

## Capabilities in different domains and areas of warfare

4.

NATO is a dynamic Alliance that continuously tries to enhance its already existing military capabilities and adopt new military capabilities. This part of the guide shall briefly focus on the existing capabilities of NATO in different areas & domains of warfare along with the enhancements NATO has been making regarding those capabilities.

# a) Air & Missile Defence and Aviation Capabilities

Initiated in 1961, **NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATO IAMD)** is one of NATO's continuous missions (that continue during peacetime and during conflict or crisis) aimed at defending the Alliance from air and missile attacks and deterring such attacks from happening, thereby establishing air command and control. It is intended to be a highly responsive, robust, and time-critical activity to help NATO achieve full control over the skies, especially during a time when new air threats (such as unmanned aerial vehicles) are being introduced rapidly. It was reinforced with the establishment of the **NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS)**,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Owen Humphreys, British soldiers train with French and Danish troops in Northumberland to prepare for roles in NATO's VJTF, March 2, 2017., photograph, Business Insider, March 2, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-response-force-vitf-first-defense-mission-russia-ukraine-2022-3.

which provided NATO with a single & integrated air command and control system in 1999. NATO IAMD includes two main permanent peacetime activities: **NATO Air Policing** and **NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (NATO BMD)**.<sup>63</sup>

**NATO Air Policing** is a mission that is based upon the principle of the 24/7 presence of fighter aircraft and jets over the NATO airspace to intercept threat-posing air traffic. The mission is under the authority of SACEUR. Even though every member state is required to provide the necessary aircraft for protecting their own airspace, those countries without the necessary means are assisted by other NATO members to achieve air control.<sup>64</sup> **NATO BMD** is a mission that aims to neutralize any ballistic missile threat directed upon a member state via the usage of sensors (radars) and missile interceptors. It combines assets commonly funded by all allies as well as specific voluntary contributions provided by several allies. The importance of NATO BMD has been increasing due to the proliferation of ballistic missiles near the southeastern border of NATO during the last few years.<sup>65</sup>

To enhance its existing aviation-related capabilities, NATO has been using an approach called the **Total System Approach to Aviation (TSAA)**.<sup>66</sup> A result of this product is the establishment of a **Rapid Air Mobility (RAM)** process. RAM is a process enabling the swift deployment of NATO military aircraft across Europe during times of crisis by ensuring that allied aircraft receive priority handling by the **European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation** (**EUROCONTROL**), thereby hastening the response provided by the allied aircraft. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> "NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System," *NATO*, Last updated January 27, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_8206.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> "NATO Air Policing: securing NATO airspace," *NATO*, Last updated March 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohg/topics\_132685.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> "Ballistic Missile Defence," *NATO*, Last updated January 26, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49635.htm</u>.
<sup>66</sup> "NATO's Capabilities," *NATO*, Last updated February 21, 2022,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49137.htm.

activation of RAM depends on a decision given by the North Atlantic Council, and it has only been activated during the COVID-19 pandemic to swiftly deliver medical supplies.<sup>67</sup> Another notable achievement of TSAA is the **Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Readiness Initiative** which aims at integrating remotely piloted aircraft systems into civil and military airspace structures.<sup>68</sup>

Lastly, the swift transportation of troops, equipment, and supplies is crucial for the Alliance to maintain responsiveness. As a result, NATO members states have been participating in initiatives regarding the pooling of financial resources to acquire strategic airlift capabilities collectively.<sup>69</sup>

## b) Maritime Capabilities

NATO's Alliance Maritime Posture assigns three functions to the Alliance's naval forces:

- *Strategic function:* Deterring adversaries and expressing NATO's intent to operate without constraint
- Security function: The maintenance of a safe and secure maritime environment
- *Warfighting function:* Providing defence and establishing sea control during wartime and contributing to NATO operations.

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NATO has **Standing Naval Forces (SNF)** that provide the Alliance with continuous naval presence and perform the functions mentioned above. They are integrated into the NATO Response Force. Of those naval forces, **Standing NATO Countermeasures Groups** (SNMCMG) engage in search and explosive ordnance disposal operations while **Standing** 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> "Rapid Air Mobility," *NATO*, Last updated July 22, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_175432.htm</u>. <sup>68</sup> NATO, *NATO's Capabilities* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> "Strategic airlift," NATO, Last updated April 16, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_50107.htm.

**NATO Maritime Groups** perform different tasks ranging from exercises to operational missions.<sup>70</sup>

To enhance maritime capabilities, NATO has been organizing maritime and joint exercises which focus on various elements such as amphibious forces, anti-submarine warfare capacity, and the protection of sea lines communication.<sup>71</sup> NATO also sponsors projects about developing modular ship designs (that allows ship combat and support systems to be optimized to each specific mission) and digital underwater acoustic communications.<sup>72</sup>

# c) Nuclear Deterrence Capabilities

NATO considers nuclear weapons as capabilities that hold a central role in deterring adversaries. Three NATO members possess nuclear weapons as of 2022: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, even though the last two have not integrated their nuclear arsenal and strategies into NATO's.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, it is important to note that the US has deployed some of its nuclear weapons in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey<sup>74</sup> even though it still retains full control over those nuclear weapons.

The key principles of NATO's nuclear policy are established by the Heads of State & Government of the 30 members of the Alliance. The development and implementation of NATO's nuclear policy is the responsibility of the **Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)**. The NPG

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> "NATO's maritime activities," *NATO*, Last updated May 17, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_70759.htm</u>.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> NATO, NATO's Capabilities

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> "NATO's nuclear deterrence policy and forces," *NATO*, Last updated May 17, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_50068.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Miles A. Pomper and Vasilii Tuganov, "What countries have nuclear weapons, and where are they?," *The Conversation*, April 1, 2022,

https://theconversation.com/what-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-and-where-are-they-180382.

provides the forum for consultation on all issues that relate to NATO's nuclear deterrence. All allies, except for France (which has decided not to participate) are members of the NPG.<sup>75</sup>

As NATO considers nuclear weapons to be substantial deterrents, it has stated that it will remain a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist.<sup>76</sup> However, NATO is a keen supporter of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Thus, it advocates for the full implementation of the **Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**.<sup>77</sup>

## Capabilities regarding protection from CBRN Threats

Classified as weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) material could severely affect the military personnel and civil populations. As a result, NATO aspires to enhance its CBRN defence capabilities as a means of being able to respond to any crisis related to CBRN threats in a rapid manner.<sup>78</sup>

To address these concerns adequately, NATO established the **Combined Joint CBRN Task Force (CJ-CBRN-TF)** in 2003. The task force operates under the authority of SACEUR and might be deployed to supplement the NRF or deployed independently (for example, in cases where it is deployed to assist civilian populations). The NATO Website defines the tasks of the task force as follows:<sup>79</sup>

- Supporting other NATO-deployed forces to operate in CBRN-affected environments.
- Support to national governments in addressing CBRN crises, upon request and as approved by the NAC.

**d**)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> NATO, *NATO's nuclear deterrence policy and forces* 

<sup>76</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> "Brussels Summit Communiqué," *NATO*, Issued June 14, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\_185000.htm</u>.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> "Combined Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Task Force," *NATO*, Last updated April 13, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49156.htm</u>.
 <sup>79</sup> Ibid

- CBRN reconnaissance and monitoring operations.
- Sampling and identification of biological, chemical, and radiological agents.
- Provision of CBRN assessments and advice to NATO commanders.
- CBRN hazard management operations, such as decontamination, including disinfection and sanitization.

To perform the tasks mentioned above, CJ-CBRN-TF includes different components that can be deployed within 2 to 30 days. Reconnaissance units, decontamination units, and Deployable CBRN Analytical Laboratories are some examples of those components.<sup>80</sup>



*Figure 7: A Bulgarian CBRN technician decontaminates his comrade following a hazardous materials sweep near Ohrid, North Macedonia during consequence-management exercise North Macedonia 2021.*<sup>81</sup>

e) Capabilities in the novel domains of warfare: space and

## cyberspace

Technological developments naturally affect the security environment. In this regard, the importance of cybersecurity in security and warfare environments has been increasing following

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> NATO, A Bulgarian CBRN technician decontaminates his comrade following a hazardous materials sweep near Ohrid, North Macedonia during consequence-management exercise North Macedonia 2021, photograph, NATO, April 13, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49156.htm</u>.

the rapidly developing technology. Moreover, the increasing dependency on information technologies is exacerbating the effects of the threats originating from cyberspace. Thus, NATO has acknowledged that cyber-attacks are as harmful as conventional attacks and tangible measures need to be taken to promote free and secure cyberspace wherein international law prevails.<sup>82 83</sup> Moreover, NATO recognized cyberspace as its fourth domain of operation (after land, air, and sea) in 2016, and recognized that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might be considered as an armed attack in certain circumstances in 2021.

Individual NATO member states are responsible for their own cyber defences. However, NATO supports its members in boosting cyber defences by sharing real-time information about threats, maintaining rapid-reaction cyber defence teams to be sent to help the allies in need, developing targets for allies to facilitate a common approach toward cyber defence capabilities, and investing in education, training and exercises.<sup>84</sup>

NATO has established the **NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC)** based at SHAPE to protect its networks through round-the-clock cyber defence support; NCIRC is a part of the **NATO Communications and Information Agency** which connects NATO's information & communication systems. NATO has also established a **Cyberspace Operations Centre**, which is tasked with coordinating NATO's operational activity in the cyberspace and making operations more resilient to cyber threats.<sup>85</sup>

The Alliance gives importance to maintaining skilled personnel in the field of cybersecurity. To achieve that, it regularly conducts cybersecurity exercises. Education and training play a

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> "Cyber defence," *NATO*, Last updated March 23, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_78170.htm</u>.
 <sup>83</sup> "NATO Cyber Defence," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, April 2021,

https://www.nato.int/nato\_static\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/4/pdf/2104-factsheet-cyber-defence-en.pdf.<sup>84</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Ibid

substantive role in maintaining skilled personnel; NATO operates different institutions where cybersecurity education, research, and development are conducted, a notable one being the

# NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) in Estonia.<sup>86</sup>

NATO's actions concerning information sharing, exercises, and training in the cybersecurity field are not exclusive to the NATO institutions. The Alliance regularly cooperates with other international organizations (such as the EU), the industry, and the academia on cybersecurity to further strengthen the efforts to protect networks and increase resilience.<sup>87</sup>

Cyberspace is not the only domain that NATO has recognized recently. In 2019, the Alliance declared space as its fifth operational domain. Space is critical for NATO from a security and defence perspective as space technologies prove beneficial in areas such as positioning, navigation, timing, early warning, environmental monitoring, secure satellite communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, all of which are needed to gain advantage against the adversary.<sup>88</sup>

To facilitate communication between NATO forces by enabling more resilient and flexible communications worldwide, the Alliance is investing over EUR 1 billion in procuring satellite communications services for the period of 2020-2034. In October 2020, defence ministers decided to establish the **NATO Space Centre** in Germany, which is intended to serve as a focal point to support NATO operations and missions in space, and the centre continues to grow.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> NATO, *Cyber defence* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Cyber Defence* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> "NATO's approach to space," *NATO*, Last updated December 2, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_175419.htm</u>.

#### 5. **Enabling Capabilities**

#### a) Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)

Intelligence is the main source of information presented to military decision-makers. It has two main components: Surveillance (the persistent monitoring of a target) and Reconnaissance (information-gathering conducted to answer a specific military question). As NATO is an Alliance aiming to coordinate the militaries of member countries (especially during operations), it aims to facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence between the allies. So, NATO has established a permanent JISR system that works on a rather simple but effective mechanism.90

The first step of this JISR system is information collection via surveillance and reconnaissance collection assets. The first of those assets is the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which provides the Alliance with extensive air surveillance<sup>91</sup>. The Alliance operates a fleet of 14 Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft, each of which can surveil an area of more than 300 thousand km<sup>2</sup>; AWACS aircraft have thus earned the nickname "NATO's eyes in the skies". It should be noted that AWACS (along with the force responsible for it) is one of the few assets that are directly owned by NATO. The Alliance has pledged to maintain AWACS until 2035 - the year set as the retirement date of the AWACS aircraft.<sup>92</sup> For ground surveillance, NATO has acquired the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system. The system consists of five NATO RQ-4D Phoenix remotely piloted aircraft (that can surveil an area of more than 100 thousand km<sup>2</sup>) <sup>93</sup> and associated ground command and control stations. After the information is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> "Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance," *NATO*, Last updated March 12, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics 111830.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Here, air surveillance refers to surveilling the objects in the skies, not the surveillance conducted by aircraft. <sup>92</sup> "AWACS: NATO's 'eyes in the sky'," *NATO*, March 3, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_48904.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> NATO, "AGS: NATO's remotely piloted surveillance system explained [Alliance Ground Surveillance]," YouTube Video, 1:35, February 15, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WX3U5E7aW2Q&ab\_channel=NATO.

collected from multiple sources, it is analyzed by various intelligence analysts possessing expertise in different fields. The analyzed data is then submitted to the decision-makers to be used in the decision-making process.<sup>94</sup> It should be noted that although the system's assets have been procured by a group of 15 allies, it is to be maintained jointly by all allies.<sup>95</sup>



Since AWACS aircraft are expected to retire in 2035, NATO launched the Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) Initiative to fundamentally redefine how the Alliance should conduct surveillance in the future though most specifications about it remain undetermined.<sup>97</sup>

To reinforce its overall JISR ambition, NATO aims to provide the following pillars:98

• *Training and Education:* Guaranteeing the JISR enterprise by maintaining expertise-possessing personnel

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> NATO, Joint Intelligence

<sup>95</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> NATO, *Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)*, photograph, NATO, February 23, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_48892.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> "Alliance Future Surveillance and Control," *NATO*, July 2020,

https://www.nato.int/nato\_static\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/7/pdf/200701-Factsheet\_Alliance\_Future\_Surveil-1.pdf. <sup>98</sup> NATO, *Joint Intelligence* 

- *Doctrine and procedures:* Continuously developing and reviewing JISR doctrines and procedures to improve interoperability, efficiency, and effectiveness
- Networking environment: Actively utilizing Communication and Information Systems (CIS) to guarantee efficient collaboration and sharing of ISR<sup>99</sup> data and products between the allies.

## b) Communication and Information Systems (CIS)

Proper communication and information systems are life-saving features for any military structure (including NATO's) as they are elements located at the heart of the **command and control (C2)** process, which is, in turn, a key process for NATO itself. In 2012, The Alliance established the **NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA)** which is tasked with administering the CIS-related affairs of NATO, thereby facilitating communication between different NATO elements and promoting interoperability.<sup>100</sup> The agency ensures information and communication security of the systems (or the assets) related to NATO, including JISR, Air and Missile Defence Command and Control, and NATO assets in cyberspace.<sup>101</sup>

## c) Federated Missions Networking

NATO is known to establish **mission networks** as a means of communicating and exchanging information during operations, exercises, and training. **Federated Mission Networking** is a governed conceptual framework of NATO aimed at preparing and using mission networks in support of federated operations (i.e., operations that include semi-autonomous elements that operate following the same standards). Under this framework, mission networks are established

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> ISR means Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> "Who we are," *NATO Communications and Information Agency*, Accessed May 25, 2022, <u>https://www.ncia.nato.int/about-us/who-we-are.html</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> "What we do," *NATO Communications and Information Agency*, Accessed May 25, 2022, <u>https://www.ncia.nato.int/what-we-do.html</u>.

using a flexible and tailored set of non-material (such as policies, procedures, and standards) and material (like services and supporting infrastructures) contributions provided by NATO, NATO allies, non-NATO nations, and entities.<sup>102</sup>

#### 6. Logistics

NATO defines logistics as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces and considers it to be of vital importance for military operations. NATO's logistic functions encompass supplying materials, maintaining those materials, transporting those materials, supplying petroleum to transportation vehicles, sustaining medical support, and infrastructure engineering, all of which complement each other during the sustainment of operations.<sup>103</sup>

NATO's logistics structure operates within the frame of certain principles, two of which will be mentioned here as they specifically address NATO's multinational characteristic. First is the *collective responsibility* of nations and NATO authorities for the logistic support of NATO's multinational organizations, which is intended to encourage nations (and NATO) to share the provision and use of logistic capabilities and resources. On the other hand, the *authority* principle states that NATO commanders tasked with certain responsibilities should be handed sufficient authority (such as the right to redistribute logistic assets of nations and to require reports on the quantity and quality of logistic assets) over logistics resources; conforming to this principle is necessary for a commander to successfully conduct operations.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> "Federated Mission Networking," *NATO Allied Command Transformation*, Accessed May 25, 2022, <u>https://www.act.nato.int/activities/fmn</u>.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> "Logistics," NATO, Last updated June 21, 2017, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_61741.htm</u>.
 <sup>104</sup> Ibid

NATO's logistics are coordinated by the **Logistics Committee (LC)**, which is tasked with addressing logistics matters in a way that will enhance the combat effectiveness of Alliance forces on behalf of the North Atlantic Council. In 1999, it decided to develop the **NATO Logistics Vision and Objectives (V&O)**, a planning tool used by the LC to realize its tasks while ensuring NATO's broader logistics concerns are taken into account during defence planning. V&O first develops and approves the vision and strategic goals, then develops and approves objectives and tasks accordingly, and finally monitors and manages the achievement of those objectives and tasks, covering a 10-year period and being updated every four years.<sup>105</sup> Lastly, it should be noted that **NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA)** holds an important place in NATO's logistics system as it is NATO's lead organization for multinational acquisition, support, and sustainment.<sup>106</sup>

# **Emerging and Disruptive Technologies**

7.

It is very evident that a firm knowledge and adequate utilization of technology are necessary in order to sustain capability development in the military field. This especially applies to **emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT)**, a concept which includes (but is not limited to) artificial intelligence, autonomous weapon systems, big data, biotechnologies, and quantum technologies.<sup>107</sup> To facilitate the development of such technologies, NATO Defence Ministers endorsed an implementation strategy aimed at guiding NATO's development of EDT policy in specific subject areas, in February 2021. Since then, NATO Leaders have agreed upon the

<sup>105</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> "NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA)," *NATO Support and Procurement Agency*, Accessed May 26, 2022, <u>https://www.nspa.nato.int/about/nspa</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> EDT's are known to present both risks and opportunities for NATO and Allies.

establishment of two important institutions aimed at providing tangible support for technology development and innovation.<sup>108</sup>

First is the **Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)**, which includes a network of more than 10 accelerator sites and over 50 test centres in innovation hubs across the Alliance. Innovators (of different sizes) accepted into the network will gain access to non-dilutive financing<sup>109</sup>, a network of top-tier trusted investors, business mentorship and education from DIANA's expert staff, and the possibility for development and adoption contracts with allies for proposed dual-use technologies<sup>110</sup>. The accelerator is set to become fully operational in 2025. Second, NATO leaders agreed to establish an innovation fund worth EUR 1 billion intended to provide strategic investments in start-ups that develop dual-use emerging and disruptive technologies.<sup>111</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> "Emerging and disruptive technologies," *NATO*, Last updated April 7, 2022,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_184303.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> Non-dilutive financing refers to the investment capital that does not require the innovators to give up equity or ownership in their company.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Dual-use technologies refer to technologies that are focused on commercial markets and uses but may also have defence and security applications.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid

To maintain its lead in technological and capability development, NATO actively cooperates with private enterprises (the industry), and the academia (including scientists). For example, The **NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies** is an independent group consisting of experts from the private sector & the academia and has the mission of providing recommendations to NATO on EDT-related matters.<sup>113</sup> Another example could be the **NATO-Industry Forum**, which is held annually to promote strategic dialogue with industry on NATO capability planning, development, and delivery.<sup>114</sup>

Briefly explaining, we can say that two NATO bodies are tasked with conducting important EDT-related work. The first one is the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which leads capability development for NATO and is currently working on a large range of EDT-related projects such as unmanned autonomous vehicles, military-grade blockchain applications, and artificial intelligence in military decision-making. The other body is the **NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO)** which, among its support to other scientific projects, supports EDT-related projects such as autonomous transport and space weather environmental modeling.

## 8. Defence Investment

Simply put, NATO is funded in two ways: indirect funding and direct funding. Indirect funding, which refers to the individual resource allocations made by the allied nations to support any troop or equipment commitment they make during NATO activities, makes up more than 99% of

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> TRHaber, *Initial Diana Footprint*, map, TRHaber, April 17, 2022,
 <u>https://www.trhaber.com/dunya/nato-nun-diana-projesi-faaliyete-geciyor-ana-ussu-turkiye-olacak-h42962.html</u>.
 <sup>113</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> "NATO-Industry Forum," *NATO Allied Command Transformation*, Accessed May 26, 2022, <u>https://www.act.nato.int/industryforum</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> NATO, Emerging and disruptive technologies

the overall NATO funding. Thus, it is vital to ensure each allied nation allocates resources sufficiently and adequately for NATO. This especially became an important concern for NATO after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, as the share given to defence investments in allied nations faltered. To address this problem, NATO leaders endorsed the **Defence Investment Pledge** during the Wales Summit in 2014. It was agreed that each allied nation should commit 2% of their national GDP to defence spending in order to continue sustaining Alliance's military readiness and military capabilities. Moreover, allied nations agreed upon devoting at least 20% of their defence expenditures to major equipment spending so that the equipment could remain usable, preventing capability and interoperability gaps between the allies.<sup>116</sup>

On the other hand, the direct contributions to the NATO budget is less and it mainly comes in two forms: **common funding** and **joint funding**. Common funding is only used for funding requirements that serve the interests of all member countries (thus necessitating a collective fund contribution from all member states), or (in the military field) for meeting the requirements that could not be met solely through national resources. When the need for common funding emerges, contributions are made according to a formula that divides the total amount between allied nations according to their GDP. Joint funding is used for funding multinational programmes wherein only certain members participate. In such a situation, costs are distributed according to the decisions of the participating members.<sup>117</sup>

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> "Funding NATO," *NATO*, Last updated April 1, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_67655.htm</u>.
 <sup>117</sup> Ibid
Nation.	Adjusted cost stars further to accession of North Macedonia "at 30"		
Applicate	ate from 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2024		
Abania	0.0908	Lumrboag	0.19983
Selgium	2,1043	Wontenegro	0.0291
Ouigente	0.3650	Netherlands	2:4535
Canada	6.8799	North Nacedonia	0.0778
Crostie	0.2995	Norway	6.7771
Calech Rest	1.2659	Poland	2 9091
Ownmark	1.3/18	Portugal	5.0495
Estonia	0.1248	Romania	1,2279
France	10.4913	Sovakia	0.516
Germany	15.3444	Stovena	0.2270
Greece	1.0673	Spain	5.9935
Hungary	0.7595	Turbiy	4,7286
foeland	0.0642	United Kingdoni	11 2825
Haly	8.7912	United States	15.3444
Latria	0.1595		0.500.0
Uthiania	0.2508	TOTAL NATO .	100.0000

Figure 10: The share of contributions of allied nations in common funding<sup>118</sup>

# B. Capabilities in Non-Military Fields

1

### Resilience and Civil Preparedness

Article 3 of the Washington Treaty states that:

"In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." <sup>119</sup>

This statement leads us to the concept of resilience, which includes both military capacity and civil preparedness. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO militaries' reliance on civil and commercial assets & capabilities has increased. Statistically, 75% of host nation support to NATO Operations is sourced from local commercial infrastructure (such as railways, ports, airports, and energy grids) and services, and 90% of military transport for large military operations is chartered or requisitioned from the commercial sector. This means that any damage inflicted upon civil services will inevitably affect the militaries for the worse. So, any attempt to

<sup>118</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty

build resilience (as a means of enhancing defence capabilities) should attempt to encompass the civilian sector.<sup>120</sup>

Even though building resilience is to be done by the member states on a national level, NATO seeks to assist its members in their planning process; thus, **seven baseline requirements** that the members could use as benchmarks were set during the 2016 Warsaw Summit. These requirements reflect the core functions of continuity of government, essential services to the population, and civilian support to the military. These requirements are:<sup>121</sup>

- Assured continuity of government
- Resilient energy supplies
- *Ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people*
- *Resilient food and water sources*
- Ability to deal with mass casualties
- Resilient civil communications systems
- *Resilient transport systems*

The top NATO advisory body for the protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources is the **Civil and Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC).**<sup>122</sup>

# 2. Capabilities against Hybrid Threats

Conventional military formations and assets are not the only threats to security in today's world due to the emergence of hybrid threats. NATO defines hybrid threats as threats combining military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> "Resilience and Article 3," *NATO*, last updated June 11, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics 132722.htm.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> "Civil Emergency and Planning Committee," *NATO*, Last updated November 15, 2011, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_50093.htm</u>.

propaganda, deception, sabotage, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups, and use of regular forces. Hybrid methods blur the lines between war and peace, therefore easily being able to destabilize societies. Even though the responsibility to respond to hybrid threats rests within the targeted nation, NATO is prepared to assist its members in the field of hybrid threats by providing **counter-hybrid support teams** (founded in 2018) to member states upon request.<sup>123</sup>

NATO has had a strategy for countering hybrid warfare since 2015; it consists of three elements:<sup>124</sup>

- *Being prepared for threats,* which includes information gathering & sharing, supporting national efforts to strengthen resilience, and conducting training & exercises.
- *Deterring hybrid threats,* by sustaining counter-hybrid threat measures
- Defending allies against hybrid threats in case deterrence fails.

As hybrid threats could be produced in large volumes (due to advanced technology), securing cooperation with partners in countering hybrid threats remains crucial. In this regard, NATO cooperates with the EU and certain European governments (such as Finland). One institution exemplifying this cooperation is the **European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats**, which serves as a hub of expertise, assisting participating countries in improving their civil-military capabilities, resilience, and preparedness to counter hybrid threats; normally an initiative of the Finnish government, the center is being supported by 27 nations plus NATO and the EU.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> "NATO's response to hybrid threats," *NATO*, Last updated March 16, 2021,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_156338.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> Ibid

<sup>125</sup> Ibid



Figure 11: The Elements of Hybrid Threats<sup>126</sup>

# C. NATO's Tailored Deterrence and Defence Policy Towards Russia, 2014-2022

NATO views the growing aggressiveness of the Russian Federation, which has been more visible since the 2014 Russian intervention in Ukraine, as the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades.<sup>127</sup> As a result, NATO has formulated new strategies & policies regarding deterrence & defence following the instances of Russian aggression that have taken place in 2014 and 2022. Before proceeding with the details, it is important to remind that NATO emphasizes producing tailored<sup>128</sup> responses (along with generic responses) should a new security threat emerges, and the response towards Russia is a fine example of this.<sup>129</sup>

Prior to the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, both in March 2014, NATO had not taken any distinct measure to enhance its deterrence and defence capabilities against Russia. However, relevant measures were adopted following the incident. The first of such measures was the adoption of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> EU-HYBNET, *Hybrid influencing can take a number of forms*, chart, February 5, 2020, <u>https://www.laurea.fi/en/current-topics/news/laurea-to-coordinate-a-significant-eu-project-focusing-on-hybrid-threat</u> s/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> NATO, *Deterrence and defence* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> A tailored response refers to a response produced especially to be suitable for a particular situation or purpose

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>129</sup> Simón and Arteaga, NATO gets an update

has been already elaborated on. However, a timely reminder about it is that nearly all the measures introduced under the RAP were especially aimed to be implemented in Eastern Europe. For example, as assurance measures, the number of jets patrolling the Baltic States was increased, and fighter jets were deployed to Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland. As adaptation measures, all the 6 HQs of the newly created VJTF were established in the territory of allied Eastern European nations.<sup>130</sup> Another substantial measure following the adoption of the RAP was the initiation of the **Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)** in 2017, which entailed the deployment of four multinational battalion-size battlegroups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland (where their HQ is also located in). The battlegroups vary in size, consist of troops coming from various NATO members, and are meant to supplement the national armies of the countries mentioned above in sustaining deterrence.<sup>131</sup>

As the security threat intensified with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO decided to take further measures to enhance its deterrence and defence capabilities. The need to take such measures became urgent as eight Eastern European NATO members had triggered the Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, which allows member nations to call for consultation in case the security of any member state is threatened.<sup>132</sup> Following a decision taken by the NATO leaders on 25 February 2022, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Tod Wolters activated the NATO Response Force as a defensive measure for the first time in NATO History;<sup>133</sup> NATO allies have placed additional troops (along with military equipment such as fighter aircraft,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> NATO, *Readiness Action Plan* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> "NATO's military presence in the east of the alliance," *NATO*, Last updated March 28, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_136388.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> Erin Snodgrass, "Multiple Eastern European countries triggered NATO's Article 4. Here's what that means.," *Insider*, February 26, 2022,

https://www.businessinsider.com/multiple-countries-triggered-nato-article-4-what-does-that-mean-2022-2. <sup>133</sup> Barbara Starr and Jeremy Herb, "NATO Response Force activated for first time," *CNN*, February 25, 2022, <u>https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/25/politics/nato-ukraine-russia/index.html</u>.

armored vehicles, artillery, and ships) at high readiness earmarked for the NRF.<sup>134</sup> Moreover, these troops were organized into four additional multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, thereby helping to cover the entirety of NATO's eastern flank together with the battlegroups deployed in 2017. Moreover, NATO has decided to step up cyber defences and scale up the exercises focused on collective defence and interoperability.<sup>135</sup> NATO reported on 16 March 2022 that it had 40 thousand troops under direct command, 130 allied aircraft at high alert, and 140 allied ships at sea in its eastern flank, as demonstrated by the map below.



Figure 12: The situation in NATO's Eastern Flank as of 16 March 2022 136

Apart from the tailored responses, NATO leaders agreed to strengthen the long-term deterrence and defence posture of the Alliance in the wake of the 2022 invasion,<sup>137</sup> making it possible to include the capabilities mentioned above while debating the deterrence & defence policy against

Russia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> NATO, *NATO Response Force* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> NATO, Deterrence and defence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> NATO Air Command, *NATO's Eastern Flank: Stronger Defence and Deterrence*, map, Twitter, March 21, 2022, <u>https://twitter.com/NATO\_AIRCOM/status/1505854454930812928/photo/1</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> NATO, *Deterrence and defence* 

# 3. Agenda Item II: Fostering Closer Relations with, and Supporting, NATO Partners in Eastern Europe & Caucasus

#### A. An Overview of NATO's Approach Towards Partnership

NATO is an organization founded for security purposes. It seeks to promote stability and security not only inside its own territory but also near its territory and in different areas of the world as a means of reinforcing global stability, which is for the benefit of all countries around the world. To achieve this goal, NATO actively cooperates with different partners around the world by utilizing certain partnership policies. NATO's overall partnership policy also aims to fulfill other significant objectives, including promoting democratic values and institutional reforms, enhancing support for NATO-led operations and missions, enhancing awareness of security developments in order to prevent crises, and promoting regional security & cooperation.<sup>138</sup>

NATO first became involved in partnership programs in 1991 when the **North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)** was founded as a medium through which former Eastern Bloc adversaries could strengthen cooperation with NATO and further European integration in line with the principles of democracy and stability.<sup>139</sup> The number and scope of partnership programs grew in size in the following years with the initiation of **Partnership for Peace** and **Mediterranean Dialogue** in 1994, and the **Istanbul Cooperation Initiative** in 2004. NATO endorsed a new partnership policy in 2011 wherein consultation mechanisms were strengthened and substance-driven cooperation was facilitated. The latter was reinforced by the introduction of flexible "30+n" formats used to enhance consultation about common security concerns on a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> "Partnerships: projecting stability through cooperation," *NATO*, Last updated August 25, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_84336.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> NATO, A Short History of NATO

case-by-case basis. This has allowed NATO to further develop various thematic partnership relations with countries all around the globe.<sup>140</sup>

NATO hosts different cooperation structures and partnership programs, which will be briefly discussed here. The most notable of these is the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme initiated in 1994 and in which 20 countries from Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia participate.<sup>141</sup> PfP is mainly aimed at facilitating practical, bilateral, and tailored cooperation between NATO and the participants in areas which will be mentioned later on. The PfP participants engage in a number of commitments regarding democratization and the promotion of peace. In return, participant countries are given access to consultation with NATO (especially through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC]<sup>142</sup>) on security affairs and to a Partnership and Cooperation Menu comprising some 1600 activities.<sup>143</sup> <sup>144</sup> PfP participants (especially those aspiring NATO membership) may further wish to participate in Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP). In PARP, partner countries and NATO regularly consult on, develop, and update tailored packages of Partnership Goals aimed at developing the forces and capabilities of partners in different areas. Since 2011, non-PfP participant partners can also participate in PARP.<sup>145</sup> Similarly, NATO has two more partnership programs aimed at promoting security and bilateral cooperation: Mediterranean Dialogue encompasses seven partners around the Mediterranean, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

<sup>141</sup> "Euro-Atlantic Partnership," *NATO*, Last updated June 22, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_67979.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> NATO, Partnerships

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> EAPC is the successor body of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
 <sup>143</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> "Partnership for Peace programme," *NATO*, Last updated March 23, 2020, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_50349.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> "Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process," *NATO*, Last updated November 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_68277.htm.

encompasses four partners in the Gulf Region. NATO also has individual global partners around the globe; examples include Japan, Iraq, and Colombia.<sup>146</sup>

Each NATO partner has the right to determine the pace, scope, intensity, and focus of their (bilateral) partnership with NATO. In this regard, there are three types of bilateral partnership documents that set the main objectives and goals of a partner's cooperation with NATO:<sup>147</sup>

- Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP): This is the standard document that shapes partnership relations. It is usually developed every two years by the partner (in consultation with NATO) and is adaptable to the interests of the partner and NATO.
- Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP): Partners can choose to take this up instead of IPCPs. Developed on a two-year basis, these plans include a wide range of jointly agreed objectives and targets for reforms on political issues as well as security and defence issues.
- Annual National Programme (ANP): This document is only offered for partners that aspire to NATO Membership by forming a Membership Action Plan (MAP). It focuses on comprehensive democratic, security and defence reforms, developed annually by the partner in consultation with NATO. Unlike the other two documents, the ANP is a nationally owned document not agreed upon by the NAC, even though NATO annually conducts an assessment of the progress in reforms.

<sup>146</sup> NATO, Partnerships

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> "Partnership tools," *NATO*, Last Updated September 1, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_80925.htm</u>.



Figure 13: A meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 2009<sup>148</sup>

## B. Areas of Partnership

# 1. Consultation

Consultation can be considered a broad concept that encompasses all the other partnership tools. Partners can share insights on areas of common interest (or concern) through political consultations. Consultation also enables partners to gain advice and support as they engage in reforms and capacity-building. NATO bodies and NATO allies consult with partners on a wide variety of subjects on a regular basis.<sup>149</sup> The **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)**, and the **Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)** are examples of NATO's partner consultation structures.

# 2. Interoperability

Partners are usually able to join NATO operations & missions, sometimes making significant contributions. In order to ensure that the partners can operate with NATO harmoniously during these operations, interoperability (the ability to operate using harmonized standards, doctrines,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> Atlantic Council, *Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, June 11-12, 2009*, photograph, Atlantic Council, December 22, 2011,

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-celebrates-20-years-of-outreach-to-partners/. <sup>149</sup> NATO, *Partnerships* 

procedures, and equipment) should be maintained through interoperability programs. To give an example, the **Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme (OCC E&F)** is used to develop and train partner land, maritime, air, or special operations forces that seek to meet NATO standards and utilizes evaluations and feedback regarding the performance of the units involved in the training.<sup>150</sup> Moreover, in 2014, NATO launched the **Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII)** which aims to enhance support for those partners that wish to maintain and enhance their interoperability. With the PII, NATO granted tailor-made "enhanced opportunities" for certain partners seeking to deepen their interoperability with NATO (these partners are called **Enhanced Opportunities Partners [EOPs]**). These opportunities include inter alia regular political consultations on security matters and the facilitation of the process for these countries to participate in exercises.<sup>151</sup> <sup>152</sup> Lastly, an **Interoperability Platform** was founded where allies and partners can discuss issues related to interoperability, such as command & control systems, exercises, and logistics. There are currently 23 partners participating in the IP<sup>153</sup>

# 3. Defence Reform, Institution and Capacity-Building

Reforming defence institutions and improving security capacity is another notable area in NATO's partnership relations as they help project stability in the region and further promote interoperability with NATO.<sup>154</sup> <sup>155</sup> In 2004, NATO launched The **Partnership Action Plan on** 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> "Operations Capabilities Concept – Evaluation and Feedback Programme," *NATO Allied Land Command*,

Accessed May 28, 2022, https://lc.nato.int/operations/military-partnership/the-partnership-for-peace/occ-ef.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> Currently, six partners have access to these enhanced opportunities: Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, and Ukraine

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> NATO, Partnerships

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>153</sup> "Partnership Interoperability Initiative," *NATO*, Last updated February 23, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_132726.htm.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> "Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative," *NATO*, Last updated June 9, 2021, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_132756.htm?selectedLocale=en">https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_132756.htm?selectedLocale=en</a>.
 <sup>155</sup> "Defence Institution Building," *NATO*, Last updated May 9, 2018,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_50083.htm.

**Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB)** that aimed at helping the partner countries build more democratic, effective, efficient, civilian controlled, law-abiding, and optimized defence institutions. The action plan is being implemented using various partnership tools and mechanisms. Of those, The Professional Development Programme (PDP) is aimed at developing the professional skills of civilian personnel employed in defence and security institutions, The NATO Trust Fund<sup>156</sup> on Military Career Transition is aimed at developing mechanisms that ensure the proper resettlement of armed personnel, Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) is aimed at reforming the defence education institutions (such as military academies) in partner countries to ensure they are operating in accordance with NATO defence education standards and values, and Building Integrity Programme (BI) is aimed at promoting the values and principles of good governance (like avoiding corruption) in the defence sector.<sup>157</sup> Education in relevant topics regarding defence institution building (including the programmes mentioned earlier) is mostly given by Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs). There are a total of 33 centres (in 12 NATO countries and 14 partner countries), and Allied Command Transformations bears the overall responsibility of the management of PTECs.158 ·1008\*

In 2014, NATO launched The **Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative**. Under this initiative, partners can request assistance from NATO in developing specific defence and security capacities in various areas<sup>159</sup> if the existing programs do not provide sufficient assistance. After a specific request has been made by a country, North Atlantic

<sup>156</sup> 

<sup>157</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> "Partnership Training and Education Centres," *NATO*, Last updated November 29, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_187359.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> These areas range from strategic advice on defence and security sector reform and institution-building, to development of local forces through education and training, or advice and assistance in specialized areas such as logistics or cyber defence.

Council thoroughly assesses this request and may decide to offer a tailored set of assistance measures called "DCB Packages". Currently, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, Jordan, and Tunisia are receiving DCB packages from NATO.<sup>160</sup>



Figure 14: A diagram explaining the Defence Education Enhancement Programme<sup>161</sup>

4. Other Areas

Apart from the areas mentioned above, NATO also cooperates with partners in the following areas (these areas are of less relevance to the agenda item and thus will not be elaborated on):

- Counterterrorism
- Counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Emerging security challenges such as cyber threats and maritime security threats
- Civil emergency planning

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> NATO, Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative
 <sup>161</sup> NATO, Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), diagram, NATO, December 7, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics\_139182.htm?selectedLocale=en.

### C. NATO's Partnership Relations with Eastern European and Caucasian Partners

NATO has been sustaining bilateral partnership relations with all non-member countries in Eastern Europe, Caucasia, and Northern Europe for nearly thirty years, especially under the Partnership for Peace Program. However, Russia's growing aggressiveness and its recent military interventions in Eastern Europe (especially its invasion of Ukraine in 2022) led NATO to seek strengthened partnership relations with the countries in those areas. This was reflected in the remarks of Jens Stoltenberg during the Press Conference after Foreign Ministers Meeting on 7 April 2022. He mentioned that NATO allies agreed to provide further tailored and demand-driven NATO assistance to certain countries in the region (e.g., Ukraine and Georgia), especially in the field of resilience-building.<sup>162</sup> This chapter shall focus on the scope and intensity of NATO's bilateral partnership relations with the countries in Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, and Caucasia.

# Ukraine

1.

Ukraine became a participant of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and the PfP Program in 1994. It soon chose to develop deeper partnership relations with NATO; this resulted in the signing of the **1997** 

**Charter on Distinctive Partnership** that established the **NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC)**. The NUC is the decision-making body responsible for developing the NATO-Ukraine partnership, directing cooperative activities, and providing a forum for consultation between the allies and Ukraine. In 2009, the NUC was given a central role in Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>162</sup> NATO News, "NATO Secretary General, Press Conference at Foreign Ministers Meeting, 07 APR 2022," YouTube Video, 21:05, April 7, 2022, <u>https://www.voutube.com/watch?v=0NdivN3COzg&ab\_channel=NATONews</u>.

Integration progress as it started to oversee Ukraine's reforms under the Annual National Programme (ANP).<sup>163</sup>

Ukraine has been participating in the PfP Planning and Review Process, the NATO Building Integrity Process, the NATO Defence Education Enhancement Programme, the Professional Development Programme, and the Operational Capabilities Concept. Moreover, Ukraine is engaging with NATO through various Joint Working Groups founded exclusively to enhance NATO – Ukraine Cooperation by pursuing initiatives in the areas the groups are responsible for. The Joint Working Group on Defence Reform is responsible for enhancing the rational and democratic management of armed forces and military affairs, The Joint Working Group on Defence Technical Cooperation is responsible for enhancing cooperation in capacity and technical standard development, The Joint Working Group on Civil Emergency Planning is responsible from the enhancement of national resilience, and The Joint Working Group on Scientific and Environmental Cooperation is responsible from identifying priorities for scientific and technological cooperation.<sup>164</sup>

The 2014 Russian intervention in Eastern Ukraine & Crimea entailed the introduction of new measures by NATO to enhance Ukraine's ability to provide its own security as NATO believed the intervention was an unlawful breach of Ukraine's integrity and sovereignty. As a result, NATO leaders endorsed the **Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP)** for Ukraine in 2016. CAP included encompassed a wide variety of programmes aimed to help Ukraine further develop defense capacities. The following are some of the areas wherein Ukraine was given tailored support through the CAP:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> "Relations with Ukraine," *NATO*, Last updated March 11, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_37750.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> Ibid

- Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4)
- Logistics and Standardization
- Medical Rehabilitation
- Cyber Defence
- Strategic Communications
- Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Demining
- Countering Hybrid Warfare, which has been reinforced by the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering Hybrid Warfare in 2016.

Ukraine has always been one of the closest NATO partners, aspiring for NATO Membership and being engaged in **Intensified Dialogue** with NATO since 2005.<sup>165</sup> It has been working towards achieving interoperability with NATO and has made military contributions to the NATO missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Mediterranean Sea; moreover, Ukraine actively cooperates with NATO in the military level towards achieving security around the Black Sea. Ukraine became the sixth **Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP)** in June 2020. Ukraine also participates in the **NATO Response Force.**<sup>166</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> "Enlargement and Article 10," *NATO*, Last updated May 18, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\_49212.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> NATO, Relations with Ukraine



Figure 15: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy together with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg<sup>167</sup>

As the Russian-Ukrainian conflict erupted into a full-scale invasion in 2022, NATO members have been supplying Ukraine with weapons, ammunitions, medical supplies, and other vital equipment to Ukraine in such areas as cybersecurity and protection against CBRN threats. They are also providing millions of euros of financial assistance to Ukraine.<sup>168</sup>

# 2. Georgia After becoming independent in 1991, Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 and the PfP Program in 1994.<sup>169</sup> Georgia aspires to NATO Membership and has been engaging in Intensified

Dialogue with NATO since 2006.<sup>170</sup> Following the devastating Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the **NATO-Georgia Commission** was founded in order to serve as a forum for political consultation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> NATO, *Relations with Ukraine*, photograph, NATO, March 11, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohg/topics\_37750.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>168</sup> "NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine," *NATO*, Last updated April 8, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_192648.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> "Relations with Georgia," *NATO*, Last updated April 12, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_38988.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> NATO, Enlargement and Article 10

between NATO and Georgia, and the development of an **Annual National Programme (ANP).** 

In 2014, a DCB Package named the **Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP)** was launched to strengthen Georgia's defence capabilities in line with NATO standards and help Georgia advance in its preparations for eventual NATO membership. Having received an update in late 2020, the package now includes 16 initiatives in areas such as air defence, crisis management, cyber defence, English language capability development, military engineering, maritime security, military medical capacity development, secure communications, and strategic communications. Two substantial initiatives launched under the package are the **Defence Institution Building School** aimed at educating Georgian military personnel in defence institution building, and the **NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre** which hosts live and simulated training exercises and certifications. Apart from the initiatives introduced under the SNGP, NATO assists Georgia with other programs such as the Building Integrity Programme, Professional Development Programme, and several Trust Fund projects.<sup>172</sup>

Similar to Ukraine, Georgia has contributed with military forces to the NATO missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the Mediterranean Sea. Georgia is also an Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP) of NATO and participates in the NATO Response Force.<sup>173</sup>

### 3. Moldova



Even though Moldova joined the NACC in 1992, the PfP Program in 1994, and agreed on an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2006, Moldova doesn't aspire to NATO Membership due to its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> "NATO-Georgia Commission," *NATO*, February 8, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_52131.htm</u>. <sup>172</sup> NATO, *Relations with Georgia* 

<sup>173</sup> Ibid

constitutional neutrality.<sup>174</sup> However, Moldova seeks to develop its military capabilities in order to effectively respond should any military threat emerge from the Russian-backed Transnistrian separatists.<sup>175</sup>

Moldova participates in various NATO programmes and structures mentioned earlier, including the **PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP)**, the **Defence Education and Enhancement Programme (DEEP)**, the **Building Integrity (BI) Programme**, the **Interoperability Platform (IP)**, and a **NATO Trust Fund** Project. Also, a small number of Moldovan troops were deployed in support of NATO's Kosovo Mission.<sup>176</sup>

Upon Moldova's request, a DCB package for Moldova was launched in 2015. The current DCB assistance includes assistance in areas such as professional development of civilian personnel, defence resource management, Special Operations Forces development, intelligence sharing and communications, standardization of training and logistics, ammunition physical security, cyber defence, and civil preparedness.<sup>177</sup>

# Armenia and Azerbaijan

4.

Even though Armenia and Azerbaijan's diplomatic ties with each other have been severed due to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and both are hostile towards each other, they are both NATO partners and NATO does not play a direct role in the negotiations aimed at resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan both joined the NACC in 1992 and the PfP in 1994 and both agreed on Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) with NATO in 2005.

<sup>174</sup> Constitutional neutrality means that a country cannot join any military organization because its constitution forbids doing so in the name of neutrality.

<sup>175</sup> "Relations with the Republic of Moldova," *NATO*, Last updated May 25, 2022, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49727.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup> Ibid

<sup>177</sup> Ibid

Both countries cooperate with NATO in similar areas. Armenia has been participating in **PARP**, **DEEP**, the **Building Integrity (BI)** Programme (which is especially important since a key priority for Armenia is to ensure the democratic control of the armed forces), and trust fund programmes. Furthermore, Armenia contributed to the NATO Mission in Afghanistan and has been contributing to the NATO Mission in Kosovo.<sup>178</sup> Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has been participating in **PARP**, **DEEP**, and trust fund projects that assist with the demilitarization of unexploded ordnance. As Azerbaijan has a long-standing interest in the protection of critical energy infrastructure (against terrorist attacks), it has worked with elements of NATO to establish an International Anti-Terrorism Training Centre. Azerbaijan also contributed to the NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.<sup>179</sup>

However, it should not be forgotten that neither country aspires to NATO membership and both countries retain rather closer political ties with Russia. An example demonstrating this closeness is the trilateral talks held between Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in November 2021, where Russia was the host.<sup>180</sup> Moreover, Armenia is a member of the Russia-led military Alliance called the **Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)**.<sup>181</sup>

Sweden and Finland

5.

Sweden and Finland are two neighboring countries that have similar partnership relations with NATO. They are both participating in the Partnership for Peace Program, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup> "Relations with Armenia," *NATO*, Last updated August 27, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_48893.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>179</sup> "Relations with Azerbaijan," *NATO*, Last updated August 25, 2021, <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49111.htm</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> Daniel Bellamy, "Russia hosts rare talks between arch rivals Armenia and Azerbaijan," *Euronews*, Updated November 27, 2021,

https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/27/russia-hosts-rare-talks-between-arch-rivals-armenia-and-azerbaijan. <sup>181</sup> Gayane Sargsyan, "Armenia Questions CSTO Role," *Institute for War & Peace Reporting*, January 27, 2022, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/armenia-guestions-csto-role.

and the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP), and both have agreed upon an Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP) with NATO. What sets these two countries' partnership relations with NATO apart from other bilateral partnership programmes, however, is that they are more focused on achieving interoperability instead of developing capabilities or defence institution building as both countries have proper military capabilities and structures.<sup>182</sup>

The following are some of the areas wherein Sweden and Finland cooperate with NATO:184 185

- *Interoperability*, through participation in the Interoperability Platform (both Sweden and Finland are Enhanced Opportunity Partners)
- Exercises
- *Strategic airlifting*, through two relevant initiatives
- Supporting NATO Trust Fund Projects in other partner countries
- *Cyber defence,* through Sweden's participation in NATO Cyber Coalition exercises and Finland's participation in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
- *Training other forces*, through The Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) and The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT)
- Participation in the NATO Response Force
- Support for NATO led missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>182</sup> "Relations with Sweden," *NATO*, Last updated May 18, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_52535.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>183</sup> "Relations with Finland," *NATO*, Last updated May 18, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohg/topics\_49594.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup> NATO, Relations with Sweden

Apart from those mentioned above, Sweden participates in NATO's Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC).<sup>186</sup>

In 2017, Finland created the Helsinki European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which is supported by NATO.<sup>187</sup>

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO decided to further strengthen cooperation with Sweden and Finland, with a particular focus on ensuring security in the Baltic Sea Region. The elements of this strengthened cooperation include regular political dialogue and consultations, exchanges of information on hybrid warfare, coordinating training and exercises, and developing better joint situational awareness to address common threats and develop joint actions if needed.<sup>188</sup>

Finland and Sweden have been pursuing a policy of military non-alignment for a long period of time.<sup>189</sup> However, the security threat that emerged following the Russian invasion of Ukraine caused these policies to be questioned as the populace in both nations started viewing NATO Membership positively.<sup>190</sup> Still, as of 8 April 2022, neither of these countries have made an official statement regarding whether they will decide to apply for NATO membership or not.

### 4. Conclusion

With the assertiveness of Russia growing day by day and having caused a full-scale invasion, NATO allies need to adjust their existing policies regarding two different agendas that are already substantial for NATO: 1) Enhancing the Deterrence & Defence Capabilities of NATO

<sup>186</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>187</sup> NATO, Relations with Finland

<sup>188</sup> Ibid

<sup>189</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>190</sup> "PM: Nato decision must happen this spring," YLE News, April 2, 2022, <u>https://yle.fi/news/3-12388118</u>.

and 2) Fostering closer relations with and supporting NATO partners in Eastern Europe & Caucasus. While addressing these extensive agendas and formulating relevant policies, delegates need to primarily focus on the overall benefits for the Alliance itself, although they also need to consider the recent developments regarding Russia and Ukraine.

Also, this guide is only meant to provide a general overview of NATO's past and present policies & actions regarding the agenda items, as it is not possible to cover everything related to such complicated agendas in a document of this length. Therefore, the delegates are strongly encouraged to refer to the sources listed as "further readings" or conduct their own research if needed.

## The starting date of the committee is April 8, 2022.

### 5. Questions to be Adressed

- In which areas does NATO possess adequate or inadequate military capabilities?
- How can inadequate military capabilities be enhanced?
- Do adequate military capabilities require some sort of readjustment or reform?
- Are there any further capabilities that could be utilized in NATO's new domains of operations (cyberspace and space)?
- What are the possible areas in and means through which multinational defence planning could be sustained?
- What are the ways to incorporate technological developments into the enabling military capabilities of NATO?
- How to effectively counter hybrid threats directed against NATO?
- Do the partnership structures, documents and plans of NATO need any reform?

- How should NATO's partnership relations with Sweden, Finland, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan evolve following the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
- Should NATO hasten the membership process of Georgia and Ukraine?
- To what extent is it possible to deter and defend from NATO adversaries by supporting

NATO partners in Eastern Europe & Caucasus?

# 6. An Index of Relevant NATO Measures, Institutions, Structures, Processes, Documents and Programmes

# 1st Agenda Item

- Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA)
- NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC)
- Defence Planning Process (NDPP)
- Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC)
- Capability Target packages
- High Visibility Projects (HVPs)
- NATO Force Structure (NFS)
- NATO Response Force (NRF)
- High Readiness Forces (HRF)
- Forces of Lower Readiness (FLR)
- Special Operation Forces (SOF)
- Readiness Action Plan (RAP)
- Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)
- NATO Readiness Initiative
- NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATO IAMD)
- NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS)
- NATO Air Policing
- NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (NATO BMD)
- Total System Approach to Aviation (TSAA)
- Rapid Air Mobility (RAM)
- Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Readiness Initiative
- Alliance Maritime Posture
- Standing Naval Forces (SNF)
- Standing NATO Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG)
- Standing NATO Maritime Groups
- Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Combined Joint CBRN Task Force (CJ-CBRN-TF)
- NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC)

- NATO Communications and Information Agency
- Cyberspace Operations Centre
- NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE)
- NATO Space Centre
- Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)
- NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
- Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)
- Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) Initiative
- Communication and Information Systems (CIS)
- NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA)
- Federated Mission Networking
- Logistics Committee (LC)
- NATO Logistics Vision and Objectives (V&O)
- NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA)
- Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)
- NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies
- NATO-Industry Forum
- NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO)
- Defence Investment Pledge
- Civil and Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC)
- European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats
- Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)

# 2nd Agenda Item

- North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
- Partnership for Peace (PfP)
- Mediterranean Dialogue
- Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
- 30+n formats
- Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
- Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)
- Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP)
- Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP)
- Annual National Programme (ANP)
- Membership Action Plan (MAP)
- Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC)
- Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme (OCC E&F)

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- Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII)
- Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOPs)
- Interoperability Platform
- Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB)
- Professional Development Programme (PDP)

- NATO Trust Fund on Military Career Transition
- NATO Trust Funds
- Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP)
- Building Integrity Programme (BI)
- Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs)
- Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative
- DCB Packages
- 1997 Charter on Distinctive Partnership
- NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC)
- The Joint Working Group on Defence Reform
- The Joint Working Group on Defence Technical Cooperation
- The Joint Working Group on Civil Emergency Planning
- The Joint Working Group on Scientific and Environmental Cooperation
- Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine

# 7. Further Reading

- 10 things you need to know about NATO https://www.nato.int/nato\_static\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\_2016\_07/20160627\_1607-10thing s-eng.pdf
- North Atlantic Treaty <u>https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\_texts\_17120.htm</u>
- NATO 2030 <u>https://www.nato.int/nato\_static\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-nato2030-e</u> <u>n.pdf</u>
- NATO's Warfighting Capstone Concept: anticipating the changing character of war <u>https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/07/09/natos-warfighting-capstone-concep</u> <u>t-anticipating-the-changing-character-of-war/index.html</u>
- The NATO Force Structure <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_69718.htm">https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_69718.htm</a>
- NATO's Capabilities <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49137.htm">https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_49137.htm</a>
- Partnership Tools <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_80925.htm">https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_80925.htm</a>
- Defence Institution Building <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_50083.htm">https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_50083.htm</a>
- Relations with Ukraine https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_37750.htm
- Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine <u>https://www.nato.int/nato\_static\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\_2016\_09/20160920\_160920-com</u> <u>preh-ass-package-ukra.pdf</u>