


CMUN

STUDY GUIDE



**UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL (UNSC)**



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Letter from Under Secretary General _____ 3

Introduction to Committee _____ 4

Introduction to Agenda Item _____ 8

Course of War _____ 10

Impacts of War _____ 16

Questions to Ponder _____ 20

Bibliography _____ 21



Committee: United Nations Security Council (IJNSC)

Agenda Item: Azerbaijan and Armenia War

Student Officer & Role: Under Secretary General, Deniz Nur Berk

Letter from Under Secretary General

Most esteemed participants, I am Deniz Nur Berk and I will be serving as Under Secretary General during the CMUN21. I graduated from Konya Social Sciences High School and I have been attending MUN conferences since 2019. For these three days, delegates should all be productive and should all come up with realistic solutions, ideas rather than bashing or blaming another country. Don't forget that this conference is a simulation of the United Nations, and you should behave, talk, and obey the dress code accordingly. My best advice to you would be to read this study guide very carefully and think of solution ideas to share and debate with other delegations when sessions start. If you have any questions regarding the committee, agenda, rules of procedure or any other concerns that come to your mind, don't hesitate to contact me via my email dnthorhild@gmail.com

D. Deniz Nur Berk Under Secretary General of UNSC

Aziz Yağız Tekdemir Academic Assistant of UNSC



Introduction to Committee

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN), charged with ensuring international peace and security, recommending the admission of new UN members to the General Assembly, and approving any changes to the UN Charter. Its powers include establishing peacekeeping operations, enacting international sanctions, and authorizing military action. The UNSC is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding resolutions on member states.

Like the UN as a whole, the Security Council was created after World War II to address the failings of the League of Nations in maintaining world peace. It held its first session on 17 January 1946, and in the ensuing decades was largely paralyzed by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. Nevertheless, it authorized military interventions in the Korean War and the Congo Crisis and peacekeeping missions in the Suez Crisis, Cyprus, and West New Guinea. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, UN peacekeeping efforts increased dramatically in scale, with the Security Council authorizing major military and peacekeeping missions in Kuwait, Namibia, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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Resolutions of the Security Council are typically enforced by UN peacekeepers, military forces voluntarily provided by member states and funded independently of the main UN budget. As of March 2019, there are thirteen peacekeeping missions with over 81,000 personnel from 121 countries, with a total budget of nearly \$6.7 billion. The Security Council is the United Nations' most powerful body, with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Five powerful countries sit as "permanent members" along with ten elected members with two-year terms. Since 1990, the Council has dramatically increased its activity and it now meets in nearly continuous session. It dispatches military operations, imposes sanctions, mandates arms inspections, deploys election monitors and more.



This site presents a useful Introductory Article as well as a wide range of other information. There is material on Membership of the Security Council, including a list of current and former Council members, information on Council presidencies and sanctions committees, and information about the often controversial process of Membership Elections. We also present Tables and Charts on the Security Council, including the frequency of its meetings, number of resolutions, etc.

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We post materials on many of the major crises addressed by the Security Council, including alternative interpretations of what is happening. You will find such information on the Index of Countries on the Security Council Agenda: Afghanistan, Angola, Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, Republic of Chad and Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Haiti, India/Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan/Darfur, Uganda and Western Sahara. We also have a section monitoring events across the globe that are not officially on the Security Council agenda, but are of interest to Member States, including Yemen. To resolve international conflicts, the Security Council sometimes imposes sanctions. GPF considers the debate on Sanctions and includes proposals on ways to make sanctions more effective, better "targeted," and more humane and lawful. The Council also frequently deploys Peacekeeping missions that bring soldiers and police directly into conflict zones. Peacekeeping is the UN's largest and most expensive activity and it can also be controversial, especially when "robust" operations apply lethal force. GPF looks at Peacekeeping Data, including the number of peacekeepers, the country of origin and the cost of these operations. We look at the lessons from past UN peacekeeping experiences as well as current operations. We also look at Peacekeeping Reform and consider the role and future of peacekeeping operations.

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In 1997, Security Council members began an active dialogue with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). GPF provides information on the NGO Working Group on the Security Council and explores the relationship between NGOs and the Security Council. The UN Website on the Council offers much valuable material, including the texts of all resolutions and the transcripts of public meetings and a lot more. The site offers Resolutions and Documents, Press Statements and monthly Reports of the Security Council presidents, as well as the Repertoire of the practices of the Security Council, including the Provisional Rules of Procedure (after more than sixty years in operation, the Council's rules are still only "provisional.")



Committee: United Nations Security Council (IJNSC)

Agenda Item: Azerbaijan and Armenia War

Student Officer & Role: Under Secretary General, Deniz Nur Berk

Another very valuable source on Council matters is Security Council Report, an independent think tank. SCR issues monthly reports that anticipate the Council's program of work; it also publishes many excellent special publications about country crises and thematic issues.

The Council is a fascinating but often frustrating institution. Thanks to increased monitoring by NGOs and the media, citizens know more today about the Council's work than in the past, but the Council still falls far short on accountability, fairness and effective action.



Introduction to Agenda Item

Main Problems In Area

The Caucasus is a mountainous region in southeast Europe that is strategically important. Many forces in the region, both Christian and Muslim, have fought for sovereignty for ages.

Nagorno-Karabakh's political and demographic history is hotly debated. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the region's majority ethnic Armenian population asserts a dominant historical presence. The territory became the seat of the wider Karabakh khanate in the second part of the 18th century, a semi-independent Turkic (early Azerbaijani) principality that was legally subjugated to Iran before being captured by the Russian Empire in the early 19th century. Armenians “constituted an overwhelming majority of the population” in the highland territory of Nagorno-Karabakh by 1832, according to one expert of the region, and roughly one-third of the people in the broader territory that was previously part of the ancient Karabakh khanate.

During a brief era of independence following Russia's 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Azerbaijanis and Armenians fought for control of Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories. In 1920-1922, the constituent republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia were merged into the Soviet Union. Nagorno-Karabakh was assigned to Soviet Azerbaijan in 1921, against the objections of Armenian Bolsheviks, and was fully constituted and delineated in 1923. Nagorno-Karabakh was an independent region (oblast) inside Soviet Azerbaijan until 1991, when it became part of the USSR. The region had a population of 189,000 people in 1989, according to the census (77 percent Armenian, 22 percent Azerbaijani).

After the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh wanted to transfer sovereignty of the region to Soviet Armenia, conflict erupted in 1988. Although the Soviet authorities refused to redraw the lines, the initiative, as well as the accompanying public mobilization and deadly battles, precipitated war between Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflict resulted in violence and the displacement of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. In 1991, when the Soviet leadership attempted to resist Armenian and Azerbaijani aspirations toward independence, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan revoked Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomous status.

Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces fought directly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, with Azerbaijani troops suffering numerous severe defeats. In May 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan concluded a cease-fire, leaving Armenian/Nagorno-Karabakh forces in possession of the majority of Nagorno-Karabakh and some adjacent regions, totaling roughly 14% of Azerbaijan's land area.

Azerbaijani government aiming to have their control over nagorno-karabakh region again and Armenian government aiming to fully cooperate nagorno-karabakh to Greater



Committee: United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

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Armenian State led to many border conflicts since the dissolution of Soviet Union. In conclusion the main problem in the region is the borders drawn by third party countries not regarding the ethnicity of people living in the region. Azerbaijan is rightfully the owner of the Nagorno-Karabakh region but the people living at the region is armenian and taking actions is Armenian state's responsibility. States taking care of their responsibilities is the main reason of conflicts.



Course of War

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the province declared independence. Armenians made up 78.4 percent of the population. Armenians account for around 95% of the population today, which is the same as it was in the mid-twentieth century. The proclamation of independence triggered a three-year war. The disagreement, however, is still unresolved today. Since the 1994 ceasefire, this territory of 4 388 km² with a population of roughly 150 000 people has become a "frozen conflict," a term used to characterize conflicts that arose after the dissolution of the Soviet Union but were never resolved.

Nagorno-Karabakh is a one-of-a-kind event in Armenian history. Indeed, it was a rebel zone of the Kingdom of Armenia, which resisted until the 14th century, when it fell. It also succeeded in establishing a micro-state that was independent of both the Ottomans and the Persians around 1720. As a result, throughout the 18th century, a national sense grew stronger, increasing the inclination to declare independence despite the presence of Muslims Turkish-speaking Azeris in the area. Following Russia's conquest of the Caucasus in 1805, Nagorno-Karabakh was allocated to Baku province, where a significant Azeri minority had established themselves. The first pogroms between Armenians and Azeris occurred in 1900, and were followed by a conflict between Armenians and Tatars (1905-1907), another Turkish-speaking people. When the Russian Empire fell apart in 1918, Armenians refused to acknowledge Baku's authority and declared Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous, before choosing on reunification with Armenia.

Nonetheless, the new Bolshevik leadership changed the situation in 1921, when Joseph Stalin's Caucasus bureau decided to move Nagorno-Karabakh to the new Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, one of the 15 SSRs that would subsequently create the USSR a year later. It also handed Azerbaijan Nakhichevan, a southern region that had previously been under Armenian administration. To prevent a Turkish-Azerbaijani border, Stalin transferred the Zangezur province to Yerevan, effectively dividing Azerbaijan and making Nakhichevan an Azerbaijani exclave. In fact, Stalin wanted to strengthen the friendly relations between the USSR and Turkey without abandoning his goal of "divide and rule." This was a defining moment. This decision infuriated Armenians because, first, they made up 78.4 percent of the population; second, they had just lost a large portion of their territory to Turkey through the 1920 Alexandropoulos Treaty and the 1921 Kars Treaty, which were signed after the First World War. Despite the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh was given autonomy, they requested its return six times between 1929 and 1987, all to no avail.

The Parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh issued a resolution intending the reincorporation within Armenia on February 20, 1988, taking advantage of Perestroika and Glasnost. It was the start of a fresh escalation of violence: in that year, an anti-Armenian pogrom in Baku's north caused thousands of deaths, resulting in a flurry of refugees and Azerbaijani military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh. In this backdrop, on October 1, 1989, both the Yerevan and



Stepanakert parliaments voted in favor of unity. As a result of the conflict, 300,000 Armenians were forced to flee Azerbaijan, while 168,000 Azeris were forced to flee Armenia. Baku grabbed control of the lone airport in Nagorno-Karabakh in November 1990, and conflict erupted across the region. While the Soviet Union was disintegrating, Azerbaijan declared independence on August 30, 1991, followed by Nagorno-Karabakh on September 2. Baku, on the other hand, did not want to lose his province, so he launched a military operation against it. The war had started.

Because of the current crisis, Armenia followed the line and declared independence on September 21. In November 1991, Baku dissolved Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomous status, restoring full control of the province, while the province's elites claimed they were the only legitimate representatives to decide on Nagorno Karabakh's future. As a result, on December 10, 1991, they held a referendum on the province's fate, with 99.98 percent voting in favor of independence. While the war was still going on, the official proclamation was made on January 6, 1992.

In the early stages of the war, Azerbaijani forces clearly dominated the battlefield. Indeed, Nagorno-Karabakh lacked a professional army at the time, and the conflict was primarily carried out by peasant groups. In the spring of 1992, however, it began to gain strength with the aid of the Armenian diaspora around the world, Armenia, and Russia. As a result, Armenian troops captured Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993 and took control of the region between the province and Armenia. Turkey closed its border with Armenia that same year in support of Azerbaijan, a situation that still exists today.

During this time, there were various attempts to bring peace to the region. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was the first intermediate. In March 1992, the CSCE established the Minsk Group, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Belarus, and Finland and is co-chaired by the US, Russia, and France. Every attempt by the Minsk Group to establish a negotiation forum failed. After it, there was the United Nations. In total, the Security Council issued four resolutions in 1993.

What can these resolutions teach us? First and foremost, Azerbaijan is vigorously supported by the United Nations Security Council. Second, Armenians refused to accept the UN's first verdicts, forcing the Security Council to reiterate its decisions in each successive resolution. Third, the Security Council never proceeded beyond words since Armenia was never sanctioned. The Security Council's resolutions are mandatory, according to Article 25 of the UN Charter. In the event of non-compliance, the party in question may face sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter. As a result, Baku accused the UN of applying a double standard in this issue. True, the UN was more prepared to intervene against Serbia during the wars in former Yugoslavia at the time.

Finally, on May 5, 1994, both parties, under the aegis of the Minsk Group, and mainly Russia, signed a cease-fire agreement. Both sides were exhausted and agreed to call a cease-fire.



According to the Bishkek Protocol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh should "cease to fire [...] and work intensively to confirm this as soon as possible by signing a reliable, legally binding agreement envisaging a mechanism, ensuring the non-resumption of military and hostile activities, withdrawal of troops from occupied territories and restoration of communication, and return of refugees.". Russia, on the other hand, attempted to exploit the situation by proposing its own forces as peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, in order to maintain Baku under its control, Moscow aided Azerbaijan in the winter of 1993-1994, while simultaneously helping the Armenians.

As a result, Azerbaijan vehemently rejected Russian peacekeeping forces, which may have provided Russia with a new political tool in the region. As a result, Armenia and Azerbaijan entered what Thomas de Waal referred to as the "no war, no peace" phase, in which the conflict remained dormant.

The "frozen conflict" and the resurgence of interest in the region

Negotiations lasted until the end of the 1990s, but no solution was achieved. A first step was taken in 1997, but when Armenian President Levon Ter Petrosian resigned in 1998, it was abandoned. The United States, according to some, forced Petrosian to quit. True, Yerevan and Washington were not always on the same page when it came to their mutual interests. On the one hand, after the end of the conflict, Armenia has strengthened its connections with Russia. Both countries agreed to a 25-year deal in March 1995 that allowed Russia to use the Armenian military facility of Gyumri, which was prorogued in 2011 for a 49-year term. They signed a treaty of friendship, collaboration, and mutual assistance in 1997, which included increased military cooperation. The Americans, on the other hand, replaced the Cold War-era containment idea with the rollback theory. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States was able to penetrate the South Caucasus and keep Moscow away from its historical territory. As a result, the Armenian President pursued a policy that was clearly biased in favor of Russia. Furthermore, the US increased its ties with these two nations, which were Armenia's rivals, due to oil and gas deposits along the Azerbaijani coast and Turkey's important position in NATO.

Nonetheless, in 1998 and 1999, the negotiations continued with three Minsk Group peace initiatives, culminating in the 2001 Key West conference in Florida. These 5-day meetings were likely the best chance to resolve the conflict that never materialized. Diplomats believed a peace agreement may be completed before the end of 2001 based on the success of the summit. The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan returned to their respective countries to discuss the agreement. The Armenians were pleased, but the Azerbaijanis objected, claiming that President Heidar Aliyev had made too many concessions. As a result, the Key West deal was sentenced to death. The negotiations, however, resumed.



After years of negotiations, the OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid in 2007 agreed on the withdrawal of Armenian soldiers, the opening of communication lines, Armenia's cooperation with Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-autonomy. Karabakh's Two years later, at the G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, the Presidents of the United States, France, and Russia finalized these "Basic Principles," which included, among other things, the following:

- return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control;
- an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance;
- a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh;
- future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will;
- the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and
- international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation”

The different leaders resolved to meet in Kazan, Russia, in June 2011 to sign a tangible agreement as a result of this new phase of talks. The Summit, on the other hand, was a flop. First, Russia proposed its men as peacekeeping forces once more, which the Azerbaijanis rejected. Second, Armenians and Azerbaijanis couldn't agree on the Basic Principles' sequencing and application specifics, particularly with regards to the Lachin corridor, which connects Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Despite this, the OSCE persisted, holding fresh meetings in January 2012, November 2013, and January 2014. The latter was especially crucial because tensions had increased again in recent days, resulting in four deaths.

Armenia and Azerbaijan, on the other hand, were not foolish and continued to prepare for war. Azerbaijan spent 3.7 billion dollars on defense in 2013, whereas Armenia spent 451 million dollars. Arms were supplied to Azerbaijan by Russia, Turkey, Israel, Ukraine, and South Korea, while Armenia mostly purchased weaponry from Russia, which held three military sites in Gyumri, Erebuni, and Meghri. Yerevan was also a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which provided the same level of protection for its citizens that NATO did for its members. Furthermore, the debates became increasingly hostile. In 2012, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said that in the event of a confrontation with Baku, his country would strike back with a "devastating and fatal blow," referring to Azerbaijanis as "invaders and brigands." "Strong Azerbaijan can afford to speak to feeble Armenia in any manner," said Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in 2013. The lack of progress in discussions, combined with new growing tensions, resulted in a more bellicose



phase of the conflict: the cease-fire was broken again in 2014, resulting in 26 deaths in 2014 and 35 deaths in 2015.

The 2016 four-day war

The "four-day war" took place between April 1 and April 5, 2016, after years of increasing tension. Azerbaijan conducted a "well planned massive onslaught" that "surprised the Armenians." During the conflict, Israeli kamikaze drones sold to Azerbaijan were employed, and they proved to be quite efficient. As Russia, the OSCE, and the EU appealed for the ceasefire to be restored, Azerbaijani forces were able to seize key strategic sites. Meanwhile, Moscow conducted a military practice near Azerbaijan's northern border, but Azerbaijani forces avoided targeting Armenian territory, which may have prompted Russian action.

This war was a new stage in escalating enmity that had been building for some time. Instead of fostering peace, the 2016 ceasefire resulted in a perpetually tense relationship. Both countries boosted border surveillance and purchased new weapons as a result of these events. Armenia also increased its military personnel and fortified its posture along the line of contact. This situation resulted in gunfights in early 2017. Despite efforts by the OSCE and, in particular, Russia, to find a political solution, the meetings held following the 2016 war were once again failed. Both parties were unable to reach an agreement on three major issues:

- Occupied territories: Despite their defeats in 2016, Armenians maintained control of the territory surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, believing that they should remain under their control because they fought for and won them. Furthermore, abandoning these vital vantage points would have weakened their own defense mechanism. These lands had been "annexed" by Baku, necessitating sanctions from the international community as well as adherence to UN resolutions from 1993.
- Status of Nagorno-Karabakh: Yerevan pushed for Nagorno-independence, Karabakh's which was the only option to accomplish reunion, while Baku could only promise broad autonomy.
- Peacekeeping forces: Although neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan wanted an external military presence, it was necessary to ensure the safe return of refugees. The only subject on which they agreed was that Russian troops should not be used as peacekeeping forces. They were both wary of Russia, despite its repeated willingness to send an army to the region.

This is a really crucial point. Moscow has been accused by Armenia and Azerbaijan of favoring one side or the other based on its own interests. In truth, Russia desired to maintain a power balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to keep them under its control. However, Russia had to negotiate with two vital partners.



On the one hand, in exchange for military protection, Yerevan permitted Moscow to own military sites. Nonetheless, the Armenians did not trust Russia as much as they did before for about 10 years due to its uncertainty. The lack of trust was heightened by the 2016 war, when Russian weaponry were used to murder Armenians. "Street protests erupted in Yerevan shortly after the April events, protesting Russian arms sales to Azerbaijan; Armenian police had to block the entrance to the Russian embassy from youth groups carrying posters and flags, and pelting the building with eggs," according to the International Crisis Group report. According to a 2017 poll, 63 percent of Armenians regard Russia to be "Armenia's best friend," down from 93 percent in 2009.

Azerbaijan, on the other hand, provided Moscow with a new military presence and currency by renting the Gabala radar station and purchasing Russian weapons: in August 2013, Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev signed a 3-billion-dollar contract for Russian military equipment. Moscow, on the other hand, has been undermining the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance for years because it threatens its energy interests: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, and Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa pipelines, built in the late 1990s and early 2000s, bypassed Russian territory and denied the Kremlin access to another diplomatic channel.

Furthermore, Armenia and Azerbaijan believed that Russia manipulated the peace talks in order to maintain its political and military hegemony in the South Caucasus. Apart from maintaining control over Yerevan and Baku, Russia has other reasons to station soldiers in the region. First, since the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, Georgia has been cut off from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two breakaway territories that Moscow still controls today. Then, since 2015, Russia has led military operations in Syria, not far from here, and the Armenian bases may be useful. Furthermore, Islamism, which Vladimir Putin sees as one of Russia's greatest threats, might rock the Caucasus. Finally, expanding Moscow's presence in the region would allow Moscow to avoid the South Caucasus States joining NATO. As a result, all of these factors explain why Russia sought to maintain its hegemony in one of its "spheres of privileged interests."

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Impacts of War

The cease-fire agreement led to political turmoil in Armenia. In announcing the agreement, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan said it was “unspeakably painful for me personally and for our people” but the decision was based on “an in-depth analysis of the military situation and the assessment of the people who know the situation best.” Pashinyan said that although “this is not a victory,... this should become the start of the era of our national unification and rebirth.” The leader of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Arayik Harutyunyan, confirmed his consent to the agreement. After the November 9, 2020, agreement was announced, protestors in Armenia attacked government buildings and temporarily occupied the Armenian parliament. Parliamentary Chairman Ararat Mirzoyan reportedly was pulled from his car and beaten, leading to his hospitalization (two people were arrested and charged with assault). Protestors and opposition politicians called for Pashinyan’s resignation. On November 14, 2020, the former head of Armenia’s National Security Service (currently an opposition politician) was arrested “on suspicion of usurping power and preparing the assassination” of Pashinyan. Armenia’s ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and economy resigned. Armenian President Armen Sarkissian urged the government to call snap elections (Armenia’s presidency is mainly a ceremonial position). Protests calling for Pashinyan’s resignation and new elections continued through December 2020. In Azerbaijan, support for the military operation and the Azerbaijani government has been high, with the outcome sparking mass celebrations. Upon signing the November 9, 2020, agreement, Azerbaijani President Aliyev called it “our glorious victory” and said, “our people’s 30-year longing will come to an end.” After the war, some debate in Azerbaijan focused on the question of whether Azerbaijan’s armed forces prematurely ceased their offensive. Families displaced from territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1990s might have the possibility to return home. A mass return of Azerbaijanis likely would require major investments. Towns and settlements in the conflict zone are in various states of destruction or disrepair, and mines and unexploded ordnance pose risks to return. Because it would be the third route connecting Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, this declaration reignited tensions. The first road was completed in 1998, crossing the Lachin corridor via the central route. The second road, which runs through the north, was opened in 2017. Furthermore, this new link would present a fresh challenge for peace discussions. In truth, the south remains strategically important for Azerbaijan in order to keep as near to its Nakhichevan exclave as feasible and to cut Armenia off from its Iranian border in the event of conflict.

2020 and the return of hostilities

And the conflict was getting closer. Several incidents occurred along the border in July 2020. As a result, protests took place in Baku, calling for military mobilization. The Azerbaijani army then started an offensive on September 27, 2020. This attack was not the result of a fresh occurrence that might have been more serious. It was the culmination of



months of planning between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Ankara sold a large number of high-tech weapons that Armenians lacked. Israel also provided Baku with its valuable kamikaze drones, which were first used in 2016. Ankara also enlisted a large number of Syrian jihadists to fight alongside Azerbaijani troops. These mercenaries were paid a monthly wage of \$1,500, according to CNN. This strategy is currently being used in the Libyan civil war, where Ankara is sending jihadists to back the UN-recognized Government of National Accord and strengthen its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The onslaught launched against Greece and Cyprus in recent months is part of the same strategy. Erdogan is determined to take any measures necessary to demonstrate his dominance in order to reassert Turkey's international role and defend its interests.

Erdogan is attempting to gain more influence by extending his presence in important territories that were once part of the Ottoman empire. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, conquering the Armenians would establish an adjacency between Azerbaijanis and Turks, a historical reference to Pan-Turkism, a nationalist philosophy that aimed to unite all Turkish-speaking people in the 19th century. Nagorno-Karabakh is Turkey's next geopolitical front, following Syria, Iraq, Libya, Greece, and Cyprus. As a result, Ankara's backing for its "Azerbaijani brothers" was essential. The Azerbaijanis were able to dominate their adversary and negotiate from a position of strength because to this cooperation.

Russia made the first step to restore peace. The Minsk Group applauded both parties' agreement to sign a ceasefire on October 10th, but it was never implemented. On November 9, after six weeks of battle, a better deal was reached. The agreement recognizes Azerbaijan's massive territorial gains, which will force many Armenians to flee these areas. Furthermore, the ceasefire allows Russia to deploy 2000 troops in Nagorno-Karabakh for the first time, a condition that has never been approved before. The Armenian Prime Minister was instantly accused of treason, and protests erupted across Armenia, calling for his resignation. Russia, which remained silent during the war, was successful in enforcing the truce and deploying its troops as peacekeepers. The early Russian prudence can be explained by four factors:

- To begin with, as far as we could tell, the Russian security assistance deal only applied to Armenia, not Nagorno-Karabakh.
- Second, Nikol Pashinyan had been getting a little too self-reliant for a while. For example, he sacked some members of his pro-Russian security forces and imprisoned Robert Kocharyan, the former President of Armenia and a close ally of Vladimir Putin. As a result, Russia's late diplomatic intervention was a signal to Yerevan that Russia is critical to Armenia's security.
- Third, Vladimir Putin was unaware of the extent of Ankara's involvement, and when he learned, he sought to maintain his ambiguous strategic relationship with Erdogan without



allowing Turkey to become too powerful in this area. Indeed, Moscow has a skepticism toward Ankara, especially with the emergence of jihadists in this difficult zone where Islam is widely practiced.

- Fourth, Russian President Vladimir Putin does not want Azerbaijan to become a new Georgia. Azerbaijan is a vital partner for Russia, and it has never employed anti-Russian rhetoric or showed interest in joining NATO. The Kremlin, on the other hand, had no desire to challenge Baku in the same way it had Tbilisi.

Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey are unquestionably the winners. Russia has been given permission to send troops and has established itself as a peacemaker; Baku has reclaimed a large portion of the occupied region, while Ankara's influence in the South Caucasus has grown. This war was lost by Armenia, and the West did little to prevent it. The EU's inaction on foreign problems has once again shone brightly. Russian diplomacy has even short-circuited the OSCE's Minsk Group. In reality, the EU is in a pickle. Azerbaijan and Turkey are essential partners since they control the southern gas supply corridor to the EU. The South Caucasus was used to circumnavigate Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it was expedited during the 2006 and 2009 Russo-Ukrainian gas crises, in order to lessen the EU's reliance on Russia. Armenia and Azerbaijan have also been members of the European Neighbourhood Policy since 2006, and the Eastern Partnership since 2009. These EU programs aimed to assist political and economic changes in the South Caucasus in order to improve rapprochement between the EU and the region, as well as strengthen security and stability in both regions. Furthermore, the EU will keep mute on these issues as long as Germany fears President Erdogan's actions and blackmail regarding migrants. As a result, the EU has decided not to select. Despite the fact that Erdogan is transporting extremists in an area where the EU seeks security and stability, Brussels has remained indifferent. Its inactivity has once again resulted in its diplomatic relevance dwindling, to the benefit of Russia and Turkey.







Questions to Ponder

1. How to provide security in the Nagorno-Karabakh region?
2. How to create a safe environment for a possible agreement?
3. How to create a peaceful environment for peace negotiations?
4. How can UNSC provide security in the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh Region?
5. Which actions should the UNSC take to eliminate conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh Region?
6. Which actions should the UNSC take to provide security to Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh Region?
7. Which actions should the UNSC take in order to humanitarian help to people suffering from conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh Region?



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