United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Agenda Item: Climate Change as a Threat to International Peace and Security

Chairboard Members: Mohammad Ruzain Bin Ismail, Ada Akın

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I. **LETTERS FROM THE CHAIRS**

Assalamualaikum and greetings honorable delegates,

My name is Mohammad Ruzain Bin Ismail from Brunei Darussalam. I am currently in my last semester as a Petroleum Engineering student at Politeknik Brunei, and doing my placement as a Geoscience Intern at the Geoscience Department, Faculty of Science, Universiti Brunei Darussalam. For TBMUN'22, I will be serving as the President Chair of the Security Council, alongside Ada.

Pertaining to the agenda item, the context itself is not fully adhering to the mandates and technicalities of the Security Council, thus directly affecting the potential success of draft resolutions that have been vetoed in meetings, simply due to conflicting dynamics. Before moving forward to determining the area(s) of conflict, I would advise the delegates to understand and outline thematically the root causes and impacts of climate change regionally. And acknowledging the complexity of this council, I hope to see substantive and relevant discussions being raised that would ensure the highest probability of success to the council. Although the status quo can hinder the passing of a draft resolution, establishing a common ground that could avoid conflict can be of good practice for the delegates.

There is still a sufficient amount of time for preparation, and that is key to being a well-rounded delegate during the committee sessions. Remember this, although your national jurisdiction can be conflicting, it is imperative to stay composed and professional. Subsequently, the order and priority of discussions should be properly raised, and be correlated from one to the other.

Along your time in TBMUN'22, we will certainly guide delegates along the way and help when in need, as MUN is a learning platform, whether you are a beginner or experienced delegate. That is all for now, I hope the best for your preparation!

Yours Sincerely,
Mohammad Ruzain Bin Ismail (President Chair)

I. **LETTERS FROM THE CHAIRS**

Esteemed delegates,

I would like to start by welcoming you all to TBMUN22, it is a great pleasure to have you here, even if we can only interact with you virtually. My name is Ada Akın, I am the Deputy Secretary-General of TBMUN 2022 and also the Vice-Chair of the UNSC committee. With the leadership of my friend and your Chair Ruzain, we will be guiding you throughout the committee.

As you all know, climate change is, unfortunately, a major determiner of our future today. Following this drastic motive, we decided on taking this topic up to consideration with you, fellow delegates, and finding possible solutions throughout our time in the UNSC Committee. Since the hardships our world is facing undoubtedly require international cooperation and collaboration, we hope to discuss with you these setbacks and request you to research these topics for a healthy discussion.

Not to worry, you still have a considerable amount of time guiding you to complete your research, so what we recommend is, try to educate yourself on the foundation reasons for climate change, and move forward with that knowledge. Remember in the conference to keep calm, aim to spread your knowledge and come to a solution with your fellow delegates, and make new interactions. And most importantly, have faith in what you're doing and have fun.

Throughout your time in this MUN, we will always rush to your aid and work to help you out, all you have to do is feel free to contact us through email! I wish you all an intellectually efficient conference with new things to learn and develop from. That is all I have to say, for now, looking forward to seeing you!

Yours Sincerely,
Ada Akın
Vice-Chair of UNSC

adasakin@icloud.com

II. <u>INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE</u>

A. <u>Overview</u>

The Security Council, acting as the main crisis-management organ of the United Nations, has the authority to enforce obligatory peacekeeping commitments on the 193 UN member nations. Five permanent members and ten elected members of the Security Council convene regularly to review risks to international security, such as civil conflicts, natural catastrophes, arms proliferation, and terrorism.

The council's structure has largely remained constant since its inception in 1946, prompting contention among members about the need for revision. Members' opposing interests have hindered the council's capacity to respond to significant disputes and crises in recent years.

B. <u>Functions and Powers</u>

Under the United Nations Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:

i. to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
ii. to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
iii. to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
iv. to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
v. to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
vi. to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
vii. to take military action against an aggressor;
viii. to recommend the admission of new Members;
ix. to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in strategic areas;
x. to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.[1]

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[1] United Nations. (n.d). **What is the Security Council.** *United Nations*. Retrieved January 27, 2022, from https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council

C. **Members and Voting Procedure**

i.   Permanent Member States

Consists of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

ii. Non-Permanent Member States

Consist of Albania (2023), Brazil (2023), Gabon (2023), Ghana (2023), India (2022), Ireland (2022), Kenya (2022), Mexico (2022), Norway (2022), and the United Arab Emirates (2023).

iii. Non-Council Member States

When the Security Council determines that a country's interests are compromised, a state that is a member of the UN but not of the Security Council may participate in its proceedings without getting a referendum. Members and non-members of the United Nations may be asked to participate in the Council's deliberations without voting if they are parties to a dispute being addressed by the Council; the Council determines the requirements for participation by a non-member State.

iv. Voting Procedure

The voting procedure of the Security Council is governed by Article 27 of the UN Charter and Rule 40 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure. Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council are made by an affirmative vote of nine members, whereas each member has one vote. The Charter distinguishes, however, between votes on "procedural matters" and votes on "all other matters". Article 27 stipulates that the concurring votes of the permanent members are required for the adoption of substantive decisions. Accordingly, when voting on procedural matters, a negative vote cast by a permanent member does not invalidate a decision, the decision stands if it secured nine affirmative votes.[2]

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[2] Security Council Report. (2020). **UN Security Council Working Methods: Procedural Vote**. *Security Council Report*. Retrieved from:https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/procedural-vote.php#:~:text=Article%2027%20provides%20that%20decisions,each%20member%20has%20one%20vote.&text=(Conversely%2C%20Article%2027%20of%20the.%2C%20establishes%20the%20veto%20system.)

III.   INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA ITEM

A. Overview

Climate change, within the context of global security, has resulted in anticipated impacts such as water and food scarcity, rise in sea levels, intensified risk of disaster, and other areas of concern. As per a statement by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), there is an emerging global consensus that climate change will stress the economic, social, and political systems that underpin each member state.

Pursuant to the past and existing climate change scenarios, consider that if the continuous flatlining to tackle the fundamental roots of climate change persists, this directly destabilizes the local governance and capacity building of a nation. Subsequently leads to a breakdown in terms of code of conduct, internal tensions, conflicts, and prolonged poverty. This timeline provides an opportunity for terrorist-based and extremist-based groups to take control of areas that lack internal stability and security.

A trajectory of this international threat has been addressed by means of discussion at the UN Security Council debate in April 2007[3]. Several representatives have raised concerns over the correlation between climate and security, thus calling upon a sense of urgency and priority to tackle this multiplier effect problem.

Although this agenda item contains the core discussion of security, the mandates and technicalities of the UN Security Council itself is not sufficient enough to tackle this environmental degression. This is primarily due to the simultaneous occurrence of other security-related risks in other vulnerable regions of the world, which in fact, requires higher priority and focus. Therefore to bridge and systematically approach this gap, permanent, non-permanent, and non-council members of this council are encouraged to first understand the root causes as to why the climate conditions in their region persists, followed by determining relevant state and non-state actors to assess the quantitative impact of climate change, and utilizing the mandates and expertise of the mentioned actors in tackling the issues present.

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[3] Bank Ki-moon. (2007). **Secretary General: Statement at the Security Council debate on energy, security and climate**. *United Nations*. Retrieved from: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2007-04-17/statement-security-council-debate-energy-security-and-climate

B. <u>Root causes</u>

This subsection will provide the general idea of the set of parameters that may have caused the concerning correlation between climate change with peace and security. The variables are as follows:

i.   <u>Political stress on scarce natural resources</u>

The prolonged and recent exacerbated-extreme ecological and climate changes can exponentially adverse a nation's ability to govern itself. Especially on the terms that the natural resources affected are considered the economical factor of a country. When there is a declining state of output legitimacy, there will be a possible structural collapse of the government. Especially if we were to account for the challenges present before the significant factor of climate change.

ii. <u>Territorial and border disputes</u>

Receding coastlines and submergence of large areas could result in loss of territory, including entire countries such as small island states. More disputes over land and maritime borders and other territorial rights are likely. There might be a need to revisit existing rules of international law, particularly the Law of the Sea; The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) signed on 10th December 1982.

A further dimension of competition for energy resources lies in potential conflict over resources in Polar regions which will become exploitable as a consequence of global warming. Desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, migrations, and conflicts over territory and borders that threatens the political stability of countries and regions.

iii. <u>Local governance on response and resilience to key challenges</u>

One of the many concerns in this context is the repercussions of climate change which has exceeded the capacity and existing resources of governments to respond and deal with already existing problems.

This, in turn, may trigger frustration and dissatisfaction within the nation itself, hence resulting in political tensions, religious and/ethnic segregation, and radicalization of ideologies. Thus, destabilizing the already fragile region.

iv. <u>Migration</u>

Migration, induced by environmental degradation, results in already high influx migrations from war conflict areas, or regions that are prone to unemployment, poor living conditions, and social exclusion. This form of migration will cause a higher concentration of risks and conflicts in existing transit areas and borders of host countries. Host countries must expect a substantial migrant influx from major affected countries.

v. <u>International tensions</u>

International conflicts between member states might arise due to the concept of climate change contributors. The bilateral and multilateral relations will be affected primarily outlining the juxtaposition between states that is accountable to the high percentage of climate change and those affected by the significantly accountable states. Ensuing this matter, implementation, effectiveness, and compliance of environmental policies play a crucial role to retain diplomatic ties between member states, thus avoiding any probability of individual-based or committee-based sanctions.

Conclusively, these root causes will hold liability to the matter of climate change.

IV. **CASE STUDY**

The case study will cover three (3) significant events which outline the parameters of; (i) issue overview, (ii) cause(s) of conflict to peace and security, (iii) current status quo, and (iv) conclusion.

A. **The Arctic**

(i) Issue Overview

The Arctic is at the forefront of climate change and is critical to the preservation of the Earth's vulnerable environment. It also allows researchers to effectively forecast the impacts of climate change through polar augmentation, a mechanism in which changes in the current climate generate more extensive alterations in the poles than the planetary average, indicating what the future holds. Increased melting of Arctic sea ice and snow exposes the darker ocean and land surface, making it less reflective of the sun's light and causing the Earth to warm even more quickly. The continuing loss of ice from Arctic landmasses contributes to sea level rise and has the ability to impact the global ocean and atmospheric currents, potentially causing catastrophic implications for those living far away from the Arctic.

(ii) Cause(s) of conflict to peace and security

As sea ice and permafrost melt attributable to climate change, profitable Arctic resources like oil and gas, minerals, and fish stocks become more accessible and occasionally contested as states argue over territorial boundaries and laws that define them. Additionally, the Arctic and subarctic lands serve as vital hubs for transportation, intelligence reporting, military operations, and a variety of other activities linked to national economic and geopolitical objectives.

Finally, as natural resources and transportation routes in the Arctic have been linked to national growth, capacity, and policy, the circumpolar north has evolved as a domain of regional contention. As a result, the changing Arctic constitutes an area of new potential and shifting objectives for stakeholder states, who are increasingly deploying military resources to acquire or protect Arctic interests, both through direct threats and broader regional force projection.

(iii) <u>Current Status Quo</u>

Climate change has the potential to exert even more strain on bilateral and multilateral interactions in the Arctic. The emergence of new weapons by Russia effectively reduces boundaries and brings areas closer together. Because of the range, speed, and precision of these weapons, it's becoming more difficult to distinguish the North Atlantic and Arctic as different theaters of operations, since both the Baltics and the Norwegian Sea may be attacked from the Barents Sea as well as land. The land, submarine, and air-launched cruise missiles challenge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) ability to reinforce both mainland Europe and the North Atlantic.[4]

From the Russian point of view, increased militarization of the Arctic makes sense and is legitimate. With several straits and passages becoming more accessible, Moscow is gaining access to both onshore and offshore resources, such as fish and possibly mineral wealth.

China 's developing involvement in the Arctic, as well as escalating US-China tensions Beijing is becoming more involved in the region, and Arctic governments are becoming targets of Chinese economic statecraft. China's economic activity, like that of the rest of the globe, has a geopolitical overtone. For countries in the area that require foreign investment, this presents a problem.

Beijing's multidomain arctic approach mirrors conventional grand strategic aims of resources, reach, and power, and includes the planned creation of a nuclear-powered icebreaker, focused investment in Arctic real estate and infrastructure, and a strengthened research footprint. Even Chinese President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious economic push to enhance commerce across Asia and beyond, has embraced the Arctic. In a period of strategic rivalry, traditional revolts problems such as maritime trade and research, which serve as a platform for regional cooperation, tend to appear more like security issues, throwing further doubt on the Arctic's status as a low-tension zone.

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[4] Henrik Breitenbauch, Kristian Soby Kristensen, Jonas Groesmeyer. (2019). **Military and Environmental Challenges in the Arctic**. *Carnegie Europe.* Retrieved from: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/military-and-environmental-challenges-in-arctic-pub-80424

(iv) <u>Conclusion</u>

Involvement of countries such as, but not limited to, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America, heavily jeopardizes the subsistence of the existing residents living in and around the Arctic region. As per the report on the Arctic; opportunities, concerns, and security challenges, by the European Parliament, clause (30) addresses the regional transition of geopolitical importance in regards to the increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region. This subsequently results in probable consequences for international stability.[5]

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[5] Anna Fotyga. (2020). **REPORT on the Arctic: opportunities, concerns and security challenges**. *European Parliament*. Retrieved from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0239_EN.html

B. **The Horn of Africa**

(i) <u>Issue Overview</u>

The Horn of Africa is a vital strategic region. Despite the fact that the Horn of Africa nations have little to no control over global carbon emissions, climate change perpetuates underlying constraints in the region, such as poverty, food insecurity, and population increase, as indicated in the EU Horn of Africa strategy of 2011.

The Horn of Africa is no stranger to political unrest on many levels. Many leaders in the area have come to power by force (Museveni in Uganda, Bashir in Sudan, Zenawi and Afewerki in Ethiopia and Eritrea), and violence has also been used to overthrow unpopular leaders (Siad Barre in Somalia). South Sudan's and Somalia's insecurity and conflict coexist with Kenya's reasonably stable civilian government; Ethiopia's and Sudan's present rough political transitions juxtapose with Uganda's and Eritrea's long-overdue changes.

(ii) <u>Cause(s) of conflict to peace and security</u>

The first three paths they discovered all had a detrimental influence on natural resource availability. This can exacerbate livelihood circumstances, increase migration, or change pastoral movement patterns, all of which can contribute to conflict. The following two paths dealt with conflict dynamics, especially (iv) how climatic variability might determine armed groups' tactical decisions and when they choose to fight; and (v) how political elites can exploit low-level community resource issues, intensifying the war.

The examples provided for the first three pathways – all of which relate to increased competition over scarce natural resources – are helpful to illustrate how violent conflict may actually result or increase. For example, in Somalia, drought and livestock losses which include losses from being forced to sell at depressed prices were shown by a 2014 study to affect livelihoods and make people more susceptible to recruitment by Al-Shabaab.

Pastoralism is already an adaptation strategy, thus the pathway associated with shifting pastoral movement patterns is significant. When contrasted to sedentary groups, their tradition of migrating their herds and family in search of pasture renders them more prepared to react to growing climate unpredictability. Conflicts occur when movement capacity is restricted (e.g., shifting land-use patterns) or when climatic change forces pastoralists to go beyond their regular routes, and thus beyond the customary and negotiated boundaries, as in the case given. This puts them at risk with other pastoralists (e.g., in Ethiopia, the Karrayus have been pushed further into Afar territory in search of pastoral resources) or farmers (e.g., in Sudan's South Kordofan, nomadic groups have been forced further southwards into farming communities due to declining rainfall).[6]

(iii) Current Status Quo

Tensions between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over Nile water sharing have been at an all-time high since Ethiopia began building on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa's biggest dam, on the Blue Nile in 2011. Egypt is concerned that the project will significantly restrict the Nile's downstream flow, which provides around 90% of Egypt's freshwater. Egypt claims that altering the river's flow will damage millions of farmers and jeopardize Egypt's food supply; Ethiopia claims that the dam is critical to the country's national development objectives.

Sudan has joined Ethiopia in proclaiming its right to use the Nile waters for economic growth; Sudan, in particular, is looking forward to the promised cheap energy and increased agricultural productivity. Failure to reach an agreement on a path ahead might result in a race to fill dam reservoirs, an ecological calamity, a food security and political crisis in Egypt, and possible confrontation between Egypt and Ethiopia. While these conversations would have been challenging irrespective, the cumulative effects of climate change, which are projected to make water supplies more unpredictable, worsen water crisis, and perhaps disrupt the Nile flow downstream, have made them even more problematic.

(iv) Conclusion

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[6] Sagal Abshir. (2020). **Climate Change and Security in the Horn of Africa: Can Europe help to reduce the risks?** *European Institute of Peace and Climate Security Expert Network*. Retrieved from: https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/csen_policy_paper_climate_change_and_security_in_the_horn_of_africa.pdf

Considering how the climate of the Horn of Africa is primarily that of a hot desert climate, it is evident that this poses both internal and external crises. Recalling the case study overview outlining the correlation of geopolitical instability due to natural resources and conflict-based groups, land boundaries and pathways are determining factors when it comes to pastoral movements. But bearing in mind that countries within the Horn of Africa are densely populated, and acknowledging the general lack of government stability, this is an opportune phase for armed leaders to strategize their objectives.

The second matter is pursuant to the water-sharing issue of the Nile rivers, in which climate change deterioration in terms of water evaporation to temperature ratio will jeopardize the effective rate of the 1959 Niles Water Agreement, which was signed between the United Arab Republic and Sudan. Hence, a high probability of conflict might occur in terms of claiming divisions of the river. Although the respective division of benefits is reliant on the average natural River yield of water at Aswan; to which Sudan is allocated a ratio of 14.5 and the United Arab Republic with a ratio of 7.5, we should consider the instance of future motions from current and/or future leaders which might not adhere to the mentioned treaty.[7]

C. **The South China Sea dispute**

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[7] United Nations. (1959). **No. 6519. AGREEMENT 3 BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC FOR THE FULL UTILIZATION OF THE NILE WATERS. SIGNED AT CAIRO, ON 8 NOVEMBER 1959**. *United Nations*. Retrieved from: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20453/volume-453-I-6519-English.pdf

(i) Issue Overview

China's broad assertions to sovereignty over the sea—and its estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of untapped natural gas—have enraged rival claimants Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Countries began claiming islands and zones in the South China Sea as early as the 1970s, such as the Spratly Islands, which have abundant natural resources and fishing grounds.

Foreign military are not permitted to perform intelligence-gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights, in China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), according to Chinese legislation. Claimant countries should enjoy freedom of navigation across EEZs in the sea, according to the United States, and are not obligated to inform claimants of military activity, according to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague published its judgement on a claim made against China by the Philippines under UNCLOS, ruling in favor of the Philippines on practically every point. Despite the fact that China is a party to the treaty that established the tribunal, it refuses to acknowledge its jurisdiction.[8]

(ii) Cause(s) of conflict to peace and security

Seeing as to how the South China Sea region is well reserved with hydrocarbons, this directly causes political tensions between China and their claimant. But it is important to understand the role of climate change that exacerbates the environmental condition of the conflicted area. If we were to put aside geopolitical context, the biological, environmental, and economic devastation caused by Chinese exploitation of the South China Sea is endangering the region's future. Moving further, we need to determine the act(s) of source within the region which causes the whole conflict, which is the sea level rise affecting the economic zones; Spratly Islands.

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[8] Council on Foreign Relations. (2022). **Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea**. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from:
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea

With inevitable sea-level rise on the horizon, the SCS's low-lying islands would most certainly vanish, threatening the convention's structure and scuttling the numerous claims. As seen by their iconic nine-dash line that dives deep into the SCS, the Chinese stand to lose a significant amount of EEZ-based territory. In light of increasing sea levels, China would be wise to solidify and legitimate its claims sooner rather than later, whether via diplomatic methods or militarily. This would also apply to the other claims.[9]

(iii) Current Status Quo

In the past, one of China's key techniques for pushing its claims has been to raise the dangers of others exercising their rights by pressuring other nations' oil and gas exploration platforms, fishing vessels, and military vessels, for example. China's coast guard deployed in May 2019 to intimidate Vietnamese offshore support vessels servicing a drilling rig on Vietnam's southern coast, an area the Vietnamese consider territorial seas and which supplies a large portion of oil for a Vietnamese pipeline.

The most serious confrontation between China and Vietnam in the previous five years occurred from this maneuver, with Chinese and Vietnamese coast guard warships patrolling near each other and the Vietnamese government releasing a statement asking for a halt to China's efforts. Chinese coast guard warships have acted similarly approach a Malaysian oil rig in the South China Sea in recent months. China might increase the harassment by flying military aircraft dangerously close to oil installations on a regular basis, a technique known as buzzing.

China might also develop more aggressive rules of engagement in response to other nations' air or marine activities in the region. Clipping a US naval vessel, locking radar onto a US aircraft, or conducting more regular and provocative military drills are all possibilities. When the US and others execute FONOPs, China mostly depends on trailing US soldiers and releasing strongly worded remarks.

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[9] Wilson VornDick. (2012). **Thanks Climate Change: Sea-Level Rise Could End South China Sea Spat**. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from:
https://thediplomat.com/2012/11/can-climate-change-wash-away-south-china-sea-dispute/

It could, however, respond more forcefully, putting U.S. forces stationed in the area at risk. China, for example, tested a medium-range ballistic missile twice in the South China Sea in late June 2019. Other nations' capacity to resupply their outposts near the Paracel Islands was hampered by these tests, which the US regarded as a threat by China to put US facilities and vessels, as well as those of allies, at danger in the event of a military escalation in the South China Sea.

(iv) <u>Conclusion</u>

The dispute of the islands between specific member states, alongside external interventions has forwarded more concentration on militarization within the affected regions. Despite the legalities of the UNCLOS, the problem still persists and thus requires member states to comply with relevant conventions and not contravene and illegally trespass sea borders.

V.   **PAST INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS**

Pertaining to the significant focus of climate change in this agenda item, we must mainly emphasize the efforts forefronted and implemented by the UN themselves, and other relevant bodies. This is simply realizing the legality and how binding a treaty, convention, and/or strategic plan is to a member state. Below are some actions executed, relevant to the context and technicalities of the issue at hand:

A. UN-EU Guidance note: Managing and preventing conflicts over renewable resources

This Guidance Note designates three main categories of conflict drivers for renewable natural resources in order to provide a more practical and focused approach for UN and EU practitioners. These drivers are based on existing academic theory, as well as field experiences, evaluations, and case analyses from the United Nations and the European Union. As these three drivers can interact with and reinforce each other, conflict prevention strategies must often take all three into consideration[10]:

(i) Competition over increasingly scarce renewable resources
The term "resource scarcity" refers to a situation in which the supply of renewable resources like water, forests, rangelands, and croplands is insufficient to fulfill demand. The scarcity of renewable natural resources, which are required to sustain livelihoods, is likely to intensify rivalry among user groups. Migration, technical innovation, collaboration, and violent conflict are some of the social reactions to competitive pressures.

(ii) Poor governance of renewable natural resources and the environment
Natural resource policies, institutions, and processes that govern access, use, ownership, and management can all be major sources of conflict.

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[10] UNEP. (2012). **TOOLKIT AND GUIDANCE FOR PREVENTING AND MANAGING LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFLICT: Renewable Resources and Conflict**. *EU and The United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action*. Retrieved from: https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/GN_Renewable_Consultation.pdf

They contribute to both structural scarcities and grievances related to political exclusion, corruption, and imbalanced benefit distribution in many contexts.

Concurrently, resource management is essential for managing disputes brought on by increasing resource scarcity and for resolving grievances before they turn violent. Realizing the national and local governance frameworks for natural resources, as well as the mechanisms for resolving disputes, can help explain why conflicts over renewable resources arise and how they can be rectified.

(iii) <u>Transboundary natural resource dynamics and pressures</u>
The complexities of managing renewable natural resources frequently transcend national boundaries. Water, wildlife, fisheries, and air quality are all examples of this. Additionally, waste management, pollution, climate change, and catastrophes pose transboundary threats to renewable resources.

While states have the inherent jurisdiction, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the legal principles, to leverage their own reserves pursuant to their own environmental and developmental regulations, they also have the authority to safeguard that practices within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other nations.

Yet, transboundary dynamics and pressures are often beyond the capacity of a single sovereign state to manage unilaterally, requiring cooperation and comanagement with neighboring countries.

B. The Climate Security Mechanism (CSM)

The CSM is intended to help the UN develop a more comprehensive response to climate-related security threats. The interconnectedness of climate change, peace, and security necessitates a practical approach that brings together actors from various policy areas. The CSM takes a transdisciplinary methodology, allowing it to respond to field demand while also expanding its policy expertise, contributing to the global evidence base, and driving advocacy. The CSM is increasingly able to provide targeted assistance in areas that are particularly vulnerable to climate change's cascading effects. This involves providing partners with technical assistance on climate security risk assessments and translating results into policy, planning, and programming decisions.[11]

Concurrently, the CSM continues its global efforts to mainline climate security more extensively across the activity of the three CSM institutions as well as the UN system as a whole. This encompasses forming alliances with politicians, researchers, and practitioners, as well as advocating for the inclusion of a climate security lens in UN procedures such as Common Country Analyses, Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks, and field mission strategy reviews. Other important aspects of the CSM's mission include capacity building, advocacy, and knowledge generation.

As reviewed, these past actions is focusing more on addressing the climate related risks as opposed to the actual conflict being the result. Discussions, data analysis and risk determination must be systematically understood in order to properly address and solve any issues concerning climate security. The only gap evident in this section is the bare involvement of the Security Council in terms of action ensuing upon climate deterioration. This is to say that Security Council alone cannot execute this matter, and thus requires the expertise of, for example, the UNFCCC (Climate Change Secretariat) to be integrated into expert discussions and proper monitoring systems regionally.

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[11] United Nations. (2021). **Climate Security Mechanism: Progress Report**. *United Nations*. Retrieved from: https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/csm_progress_report_2021_final.pdf

VI. **RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, FRAMEWORK, REPORT, AND TREATY**

Certain forms of documents, such as but not limited to; resolutions, frameworks, and treaties - are at times legally binding and function to address existing problems and propose solutions. Below are some documents which are highly significant to the agenda item:

A. Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

The Working Group I contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report quantifies the most recent breakthroughs in climate research and integrates numerous lines of evidence from paleoclimate, datasets, process knowledge, and global and regional climate simulations to address the most up-to-date physical understanding of the climate system and climate change.[12]

B. Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) Strategic Plan 2020 - 2022

The UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) is entrusted with assisting Member States in averting violent conflict and establishing and maintaining peace in an exceedingly complex and unpredictable global environment. Violent conflict has increased dramatically over the world in recent years, causing enormous human suffering and jeopardizing vital political and development gains.

Focusing on Strategic Objective 5 of the Strategic Plan: Strengthened partnerships at the regional, national and local levels, The DPPA contributes to the strengthening of collaborative regional, national, and local conflict prevention, negotiation, and facilitation competencies. Partnerships enable the UN to address conflict drivers through technical and programmatic assistance, to respond to new and emerging risks, such as climate change, and to link UN participation to longer-term sustainable solutions.[13]

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[12] IPCC. (2021). **Sixth Assessment Report: Full Repor**t. *IPCC.* Retrieved from: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Full_Report.pdf
[13] DPPA. (2020). **STRATEGIC PLAN UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING AFFAIRS 2020 - 2022**. *DPPA*. Retrieved from:https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/undppa_strategic_plan_2020-2022.pdf

C. Paris Climate Agreement

The Paris Agreement on Climate Change is a legally binding international treaty on the subject of climate change. It was accepted by 196 Parties at the United Nations Conference on Climate Change (COP 21) in Paris on December 12, 2015, and went into effect on November 4, 2016. The Paris Agreement's implementation necessitates economic and societal transformations based on the best available knowledge. The Paris Agreement is based on a five-year cycle of countries taking progressively ambitious climate action. Countries must disclose their climate action plans, designated as nationally defined contributions (NDCs), by 2020.[14]

Link to the Paris Agreement:

https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf

Questioning as to why there are no passed draft resolutions by the Security Council, it is simply due to the usage of veto in the voting procedure. An instance is the 8926th Security Council meeting which took place on 13 December 2021.

On the given day, the Security Council rejected a draft resolution that would have included climate-related security risk as a fundamental component of UN conflict prevention initiatives aimed at reducing the risk of war relapse in a controversial meeting.

The Council, operating under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, rejected the draft by a recorded vote of 12 in favor to 2 against (India, Russian Federation), with 1 abstention (China).[15]

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VII.   QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER (QARMAs)

1. Where does your country stand on interconnecting climate change with security risks? If any, please substantiate the stance(s).

2. Is Security Council alone, pertaining upon its mandate, reliant enough to address the impact of climate change on peace and security? If yes/no, provide your explanations referencing relevant charter(s), and past actions.

3. What are the systematic gap(s) in the Security Council that hinder the body from sub-focusing on climate change? If any, how would you address the gaps?

4. What other UN organs/bodies and other relevant independent bodies have the capacity and mandate, especially in the status of legally binding treaties, to assist the Security Council in determining the root causes and monitoring climate change?

5. Are there any existing conventions/treaties encompassing climate-related risks which are legally binding? If yes, further explain the context of the conventions/treaties and their relevance to the agenda item.

6. Should the council's dynamic establish - if there is none - legally binding legislation regarding conflict over natural resources, due to climate change, be it scarce or heavily reserved? If yes/no, please provide your reasoning(s) as to how such legislation will either benefit or jeopardize your country.

7. What role should UNSC execute, on heavily affected regions due to climate change, which is prone to conflict? If any, please include personnel(s) involved, strategies, and post-conflict implementations.

8. What consequences should be given to countries, experiencing bilateral border disputes, which are sending off troops or supporting opposing proxies to their neighboring countries?

9. Has there been any success in assisting regions that are frequenting violence due to environmental degradation? If any, can the resilient efforts executed be integrated within the structure of the Security Council?

VIII.   <u>REFERENCES</u>

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